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Navigating the Bylaw Maze in NCAA  
Major-Infractions Cases 
Mike Rogers∗ & Rory Ryan∗∗
An unfamiliar number appears on your caller ID at work.  After 
hanging up, you will wish the caller had been merely an IRS agent in-
forming you of a personal audit.  Instead, it is much worse.  You are 
an employee of a National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) 
member institution, and the call is from ESPN seeking an immediate 
response to an allegation of a major infraction of NCAA rules.  If you 
have never been here before, you are about to enter an unfamiliar 
arena where the stakes are high and the public scrutiny intense. 
Merely learning your permissible options will be challenging, time-
consuming, necessary, and insufficient to achieve your desired re-
sults.  The NCAA Bylaws require certain conduct and prohibit other 
conduct.  They establish time deadlines and procedures.  Navigating 
the Bylaw maze is no small task and is essential to determining your 
permissible options.  In short, the Bylaws help to answer questions 
that start with “Can I” or “Must I.”  But there is another set of ques-
tions that is equally important—questions that begin with “Should I.”  
The strategic questions.  You can, but should you?  You must do this, 
but should you do more, and how should you do it? 
 In a recent, outstanding article, Gene Marsh and Marie Robbins 
provided “some insight into compliance programs and the infractions 
process from the perspective of insiders,” but noted that their article 
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was “not a ‘How to Guide’ for handling an infractions case from start 
to finish.”1  In part, this Article picks up where Marsh and Robbins 
left off.  Recognizing that no article can foresee every contingency, 
we kept the Article’s scope intentionally broad, hoping to use our ex-
periences and perspectives from other areas of law both to educate 
those in the trenches (such as our call recipient) and to provoke 
thought about potential reform.2  To answer the “Can I” questions 
mentioned above, we help the reader navigate the Bylaw maze.  To 
evaluate the strategic “Should I” concerns, we rely upon both: (1) our 
institutional experience at Baylor University, including a recent case 
described by one former NCAA director as the “most extraordinary 
case he’s ever seen;”3 and (2) interviews by people who have been in-
volved on all sides of recent major-infractions cases.4  
We hope this Article will be particularly useful to lawyers in-
volved in major-infractions cases.  This hope arises from the different 
perspectives of this Article’s authors.  Later, we will describe the 
NCAA enforcement process as a clash of cultures.  It’s an adversarial 
process, but it differs in many ways from the systems in which adver-
sarial disputes are normally resolved in this country—the civil and 
criminal justice systems.  One author has extensive experience han-
dling major-infractions cases.  The other teaches courses in Federal 
Courts and Civil Procedure, and is, like many in the anticipated audi-
ence, still learning about the NCAA process.  Hopefully, the content 
 1 Gene Marsh & Marie Robbins, Weighing the Interests of the Institution, the Member-
ship and Institutional Representatives in an NCAA Investigation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 667, 670 
(2003). 
 2 Mike Rogers, one of the coauthors, served as chair of Baylor’s Compliance In-
vestigation Committee during the recent high-profile infractions case discussed 
throughout the Article and has extensive competence with NCAA compliance mat-
ters.  Details and insights contained in this Article, if not attributed to someone else, 
are based upon Rogers’s experience or investigation.  For more information about 
the case see Jeff Miller & Lee Hancock, Baylor Reveals Violations, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Feb. 27, 2004, at 1A; Jeff Miller, Baylor Reveals More NCAA Violations, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 12, 2003, at 1A; Jeff Miller, Baylor Coach, AD Resign, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 9, 2003, at 1A; Kevin Sherrington, Truth Saves Baylor on Decision 
Day, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 24, 2005, at 1C. 
 3 Telephone interview with Richard J. Evrard, Attorney, Sports Law Div., Bond, 
Schoeneck & King, PLLC, Overland Park, Kan. (Dec. 7, 2006).  Mr. Evrard served as 
a member of the NCAA staff for seven years—as a member of the enforcement staff 
and later as director of legislative services—before he entered private practice. 
 4 Interviewees who graciously agreed to be interviewed were David Price, the 
NCAA’s vice president for enforcement services; Josephine R. Potuto, chair of the 
NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions, and a law professor and FAR at the Uni-
versity of Nebraska-Lincoln; Thomas C. Hosty, director of enforcement; and Richard 
J. Evrard, attorney, in Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC, a firm that specializes in in-
fractions cases and compliance matters. 
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and structure of this Article, which focuses often on the differences 
between the legal system and the enforcement procedures, will help 
to speed up the learning curve and add perspective. 
As we proceed, we resist the popular trend of uncritically and 
hyperbolically condemning the NCAA staff and enforcement proce-
dures.5  To the lawyer or person familiar with the court system within 
the United States, the many procedural differences in NCAA en-
forcement proceedings often trigger surprise, disapproval, and ulti-
mately criticism of the NCAA.  But this initial reaction must be tem-
pered.  While human nature favors demonizing one’s opponent, a 
generic reference to the NCAA is often misplaced; the NCAA is not a 
monolithic entity.  It is a voluntary association of members with rules 
made by the membership.  To the extent that individuals (such as the 
enforcement staff) exercise powers as full-time employees of the As-
sociation, it is only because the members have delegated that power 
to them.  While it may be appealing to criticize the NCAA as a sinister 
monster, a more careful probe into the goals, obligations, and limita-
tions of the NCAA is needed. 
Given the limited nature of the NCAA’s power, some procedural 
differences must exist in enforcement proceedings as compared to 
judicial proceedings. The NCAA cannot issue subpoenas.  It has no 
contempt power.  The sheriff will not arrive to enforce judgment.  
The NCAA depends upon self-policing.  And yet, ensuring strict 
compliance is essential to ensuring a level playing field for those insti-
tutions that follow the rules.  To accommodate these realities, some 
procedures are more rigid and others are more flexible than those 
found in the legal system.  To be sure, improvement is possible and 
necessary, but it is not helpful to pretend that the rules are easier to 
fix than they are.  After all, when the governed make the rules, one 
would expect that flawed—yet easily fixable—rules would be fixed.  
Thus, while we occasionally will criticize existing procedures and sug-
 5 A wealth of material already exists that calls for reform of the NCAA enforce-
ment process.  This Article provides practical and strategic guidance to work within 
the existing enforcement system, with occasional recommendations for change.  For 
more perspective on the various competing interests in the enforcement process and 
potential areas of reform, see K. Alexa Otto, Major Violations and NCAA ‘Powerhouse’ 
Football Programs: What Are the Odds of Being Charged, 15 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 39, 54 
(2005), which draws a correlation between the amount of revenue a college football 
program generates and the likelihood that the school will face a major-infractions 
charge; and James Hopkins, Comment, NCAA Penalties: Corporate Accountability for 
Coaches and Presidents, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 181 (2003), 
which suggests that many of the NCAA penalties punish uninvolved individuals 
rather than the wrongdoers. 
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gest reform, we will do so only with a balanced view of the practical 
realities. 
The Article, which is limited in scope to Division I major-
infractions cases, proceeds in three Sections.  Section I provides a ba-
sic introduction to the NCAA enforcement structure and major-
infractions cases and compares NCAA procedures to those commonly 
followed in United States courtrooms.6  Section II covers the investi-
gative stage, including procedures, the duty to cooperate, and 
whether and how to conduct internal investigations.7  Finally, Section 
III covers the procedures and strategic considerations involved with 
adversarial proceedings before the Committee on Infractions 
(“COI”) and with deciding whether to appeal to the Infractions Ap-
peals Committee (“IAC”).8
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NCAA AND  
THE ENFORCEMENT PROCESS 
The NCAA enforcement process is, to use a fancy Latin phrase, 
sui generis—meaning it is of its own kind.  In this Section, to provide 
perspective on that process, we discuss two topics.  First, we provide a 
very basic overview of the structure of the NCAA and the primary ac-
tors the institution encounters during the investigation and “trial.”  
Recent articles detail the NCAA structure,9 so we provide only the ba-
sics here and point the reader to those sources for a more detailed 
explanation.  Second, we compare the NCAA enforcement process 
with adversarial proceedings in the United States legal system. 
 6 See infra Section I. 
 7 See infra Section II. 
 8 See infra Section III.  Section III will address the decision whether to appeal, 
but it will not delve into the procedures involved with prosecuting an appeal to the 
IAC. 
 9 See Greg Heller, Preparing for the Storm: The Representation of a University Accused of 
Violating NCAA Regulations, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 295, 299–301 (1996); Mathew M. 
Keegan, Comment, Due Process and the NCAA: Are Innocent Student-Athletes Afforded Ade-
quate Protection from Improper Sanctions? A Call for Change in the NCAA Enforcement Proce-
dures, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 297, 299–301 (2005); Alain Lapter, Bloom v. NCAA: A Pro-
cedural Due Process Analysis and the Need for Reform, 12 SPORTS LAW. J. 255, 264–66 
(2005); Katherine Elizabeth Maskevich, Comment, Getting Due Process into the Game: A 
Look at the NCAA’s Failure to Provide Member Institutions with Due Process and the Effect on 
Student-Athletes, 15 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 299, 301–03 (2005). 
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A. The Enforcement Staff and the Committee on Infractions 
The NCAA is a member-governed, voluntary association of col-
leges10 originally formed to address safety issues in college football.11  
In the 100 years since its creation, the NCAA has grown in both the 
number of member institutions12 and in the scope of the Associa-
tion’s authority.13  The Executive Committee is the guiding force of 
the NCAA, and that Committee sets the Association’s policy agenda, 
identifies issues within the Association, and approves and oversees the 
budget.14  The Executive Committee consists of sixteen member-
institution presidents and chancellors who are appointed by their di-
visions.15  The NCAA president and three other non-voting members 
also sit on the Executive Committee.16
While the Executive Committee functions as the policymaking 
authority, the COI will be our call recipient’s ultimate adversary if the 
allegations reach the trial stage.  Established in 1954, the COI gov-
erns the enforcement functions of the Association.17  As the Associa-
tion’s role in regulating intercollegiate athletics evolved and broad-
ened, the need arose for a formal enforcement mechanism to ensure 
compliance with its rules.18  The COI serves in a judicial capacity, and 
the enforcement staff members act as investigators and prosecutors 
when adversarial proceedings reach the COI.19  While the enforce-
ment staff and the COI both play roles in the enforcement process, 
the two are very different.  The enforcement staff comprises full-time 
NCAA employees who investigate alleged infractions and handle the 
 10 Symposium, The State of Division I College Athletics: Are We Playing by the Rules? A 
Debate over the Need for NCAA Regulation Reform, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 439, 452 
(2005). 
 11 W. Burlette Carter, The Age of Innocence: The First 25 Years of the National Colle-
giate Athletic Association, 1906 to 1931, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 211, 219 (2006). 
 12 Id. at 225 (stating that only thirty-nine institutions ratified the NCAA’s constitu-
tion in 1906).  Today, there are more than 1250 member schools.  
http://www.ncaa.org (follow “About the NCAA” hyperlink; then follow “member-
ship” hyperlink). 
 13 See Carter, supra note 11, at 273–75. 
 14 NCAA, 2006–2007 Division I Manual, Const. art. 4.1.2 (2006) [hereinafter 
NCAA Manual]. 
 15 Id. art. 4.1.1. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Heller, supra note 9, at 298. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics: Time for a New Game 
Plan, 46 ALA. L. REV. 487, 494 (1995). 
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daily demands of enforcement.20  In sharp contrast, the COI com-
prises no full-time Association employees.  Rather, it consists of a ten-
member panel, made up of NCAA member representatives and 
members of the general public.21  The enforcement staff investigates 
and pursues alleged rule violations22 while the COI resolves issues of 
fact that pertain to alleged violations, determines when a violation 
has occurred, and imposes the penalties.23
B. Comparing Enforcement Proceedings to U.S. Legal Proceedings 
The NCAA enforcement process is perhaps described best as a 
clash of cultures.  In many ways it is similar to a criminal proceeding.  
There are charges, a trial, and potential consequences that, to certain 
fans, might seem to deprive their beloved team of a competitive lib-
erty.  Because of these similarities, lawyer participants often expect to 
encounter principles and procedures that normally accompany ad-
versarial judicial proceedings.  The NCAA process is different, and 
the following subsections highlight the differences to provide con-
text. 
1. The Actors, Separation of Powers, and Due Process 
In a criminal proceeding, the prosecutor plays for one team (the 
people) and tries to convince a detached referee (the judge) that the 
other team (the defendant) violated the rules of the game.  Ethical 
rules prohibit any of the players from interacting with the referee ex 
parte.24  By separating powers and keeping the referee detached, our 
criminal justice system advances the goals of impartiality and, impor-
tantly, the appearance of impartiality.25
Although powers are not as separated in NCAA enforcement 
proceedings, one should not overstate the difference.  At first glance, 
one might superficially observe that the enforcement process is dif-
ferent because the NCAA is both the prosecutor and the judge.  But 
at that level of generality, the same could be said of a federal criminal 
proceeding—the U.S. government is also both the prosecutor and 
judge.  Instead of painting so broadly, it is important to first realize 
 20 Dan Matheson, Assoc. Dir., NCAA Enforcement Staff, The NCAA Major En-
forcement Process, Presentation at NCAA Regional Rules Compliance Seminar in 
Dallas, Tex. (June 2006). 
 21 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 19.1.1. 
 22 Id. at Bylaw 32.2.1. 
 23 Id. at Bylaw 19.1.3. 
 24 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(b) (2002). 
 25 See BENNET L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 13.14 (2d ed. 1999). 
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that there are separate bodies within the NCAA.  The investigators 
are members of the enforcement staff, while the “judge” is the COI.26  
The enforcement staff members are full-time employees of the 
NCAA, while the members of the COI are not full-time employees, 
and instead are appointed by the Management Council.27  Most of 
the decision-makers are representatives of the governed, not unlike a 
jury.28
One subtle absence of separation shapes NCAA proceedings.  In 
a typical criminal proceeding, the prosecutor acts as a buffer.  The 
police zealously pursue criminals, but the prosecutor may refuse to 
prosecute the case that the police have so vigorously compiled.  With 
the enforcement staff acting as both police and prosecutor, this quasi-
detached buffer is removed.29
Despite some separation between the COI and the enforcement 
staff “branches” of the NCAA, one procedure in particular creates an 
initial perception that the two branches are too closely aligned.  After 
the preliminary conference,30 which precedes the trial before the 
COI, the enforcement staff prepares a memorandum called the En-
forcement Staff Case Summary, which summarizes the case for the 
COI.31  At first glance, the function of this document seems analo-
gous to that of a bench brief.  A bench brief—usually prepared by a 
judicial clerk—provides the court with a summary and thorough 
analysis of a case, including facts, applicable law, and the arguments 
advanced.32  In a criminal case, imagine the defense lawyer’s reaction 
to learning that the prosecutor prepared the bench brief the judge 
used to conduct the hearing.  Neither adversary is particularly well-
suited to provide an objective summary of the forthcoming adversar-
ial proceeding.  If this summary functioned as a bench brief, it would 
be troubling indeed. 
 26 The NCAA also includes an appellate body—the IAC—with authority to review 
the decisions of the COI and the penalties imposed in major-infractions cases.  
NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 19.2.1; see infra Section III.B. 
 27 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 19.1.  The COI consists of ten members: 
seven from member institutions or conferences, and at least two from the general 
public.  Id. at Bylaw 19.1.1. 
 28 Id.  
 29 For completeness, it should be noted that the vice president for enforcement 
serves some filtering role, perhaps comparable to the chief of police.  Id. at Bylaw 
19.1.2.1 (directing the vice president for enforcement to determine whether the 
charge is a secondary or major infraction). 
 30 See infra, Section II.A.2. 
 31 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.6.7. 
 32 Julia A. Follansbee, The Ninth Circuit: An Inside Perspective, 22 MONT. LAW. 9, 18 
(1997). 
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But reality differs from the initial perception.  The document is 
not a bench brief, but is instead more analogous to a reply brief by the 
enforcement staff.  The document’s official title is the “Enforcement 
Staff Summary Case Statement,”33 thus reflecting that it is the staff’s 
view of the summary of the case as it stands.  The staff files the Notice 
of Allegations,34 the institution files its response,35 the parties attend 
the preliminary conference,36 and then after the parties have joined 
issues, the staff writes its reply in the form of the Enforcement Staff 
Case Summary.37  This is how both the COI38 and the enforcement 
staff39 view the document.  Also, according to an interview with Tho-
mas C. Hosty of the enforcement staff, the staff generally allows the 
institution to review the summary and accepts suggestions regarding 
how the contended points are framed.40  Also important is that the 
Enforcement Staff Case Summary is not part of the record on ap-
peal.41  Finally, the COI’s reputation for preparedness should allevi-
ate any lingering concern.  If the COI were a less prepared tribunal—
if, for example, the COI members relied heavily upon the summary 
while only skimming the Notice of Allegations and the institution’s 
response—the case summary might play a more prominent role.  To 
the contrary, the COI was described by one tough critic as “the best 
prepared and toughest tribunal you will ever face.  In our case, they 
had read the case summary, the institution’s response, and the exhib-
its to the response.  And they asked questions about all of the 
above.”42
Another difference in COI proceedings is the lack of formal due 
process protection.43  As part of the United States Constitution, the 
 33 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.6.7 (emphasis added). 
 34 Id. at Bylaw 32.6.1. 
 35 Id. at Bylaw 32.6.5. 
 36 Id. at Bylaw 32.6.6. 
 37 Id. at Bylaw 32.6.7. 
 38 Telephone interview with Jo Potuto, Chair, NCAA Div. I COI (Jan. 2, 2007). 
 39 Telephone interview with Thomas C. Hosty, Dir. of Enforcement, NCAA (Jan. 
3, 2007). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Interview with William D. Underwood, President, Mercer Univ., in Waco, Tex. 
(Nov. 24, 2006).  President Underwood, a former member of the Baylor law faculty, 
represented Baylor in three separate infractions hearings, including the recent men’s 
basketball case. 
 43 Relatedly, while the Bylaws grant the right to counsel, NCAA Manual, supra 
note 14, art. 32.3.6, unlike a criminal defendant, if a person cannot afford counsel, 
one will not be appointed for him or her.  For a discussion of an accused’s right to 
have an attorney appointed to him in a criminal proceeding, see Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 469–473 (1966). 
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only limits state 
action.44  Because the NCAA is not a state (nor a state actor), the Due 
Process Clause does not constrain it directly.45  Although its private-
actor status prohibits redress in the courts for violations of due proc-
ess under the U.S. Constitution, Bylaw 19.4.146 provides due-process-
like protection, granting member institutions accused of major viola-
tions the right to fair notice and a meaningful opportunity to appear 
and defend.47  The difference is that the COI—not the courts—
determines whether the notice was fair and the opportunity meaning-
ful.48
In summary, while the Bylaws contain some structural and pro-
cedural protections against concentrated power and unfair proceed-
ings, adversarial proceedings under the Bylaws differ from criminal 
prosecutions, which are constrained by the U.S. Constitution, and 
which are shaped by procedures tailored to the criminal justice sys-
tem of a sovereign with powers that exceed those of the NCAA.  Pow-
ers are separated, but not completely.  More cooperation exists.  And 
as shown in the next subsection, more cooperation is expected of an 
accused institution.  Some process is due under the Bylaws, but not 
constitutional due process.  Moving forward, keep these differences 
in mind as we consider strategic choices.  In simplest terms, when the 
adversary has more power and access to the decision-maker, a strategy 
that features cooperation and civility deserves even greater considera-
tion than it would in the criminal system, which features more rigid 
separation between a potentially aggravated opponent and the refe-
ree. 
2. The Duty to Cooperate 
In an NCAA enforcement proceeding, you have no right to re-
main silent.  In fact, you have the duty to incriminate yourself if you 
 44 CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1203–07 (9th ed. 2001) (discussing the 
limited application of the Fourteenth Amendment to “state action” and outlining the 
contours of that doctrine). 
 45 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988).  The Supreme Court’s decision 
to exclude the NCAA from due process analysis has drawn tremendous attention 
from commentators.  See, e.g., Lapter, supra note 9, at 295–97. 
 46 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 19.4.1. 
 47 Cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970) (“One of the most basic of the 
rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in 
the courtroom at every stage of his trial.”).  This right stems from the Sixth Amend-
ment’s Confrontation Clause, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id. 
 48 See NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.8.7 (giving the COI discretion to 
determine the hearing procedure). 
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are guilty.  In stark contrast to the criminal justice system, the Bylaws 
impose an affirmative obligation to cooperate with an investigation 
and to assist in developing full information, whether exculpatory or 
against the institution’s interest.49  For example, when preparing a 
client for a deposition, skilled trial lawyers know that sound advice is 
to inform the witness to answer only the question asked and not to 
volunteer information.50  No lawyer tells her client to volunteer smok-
ing-gun evidence when opposing counsel does not request it.  Con-
trast that with a common instruction given by NCAA enforcement 
staff members to witnesses.  Staff members often start the interview by 
not only warning the witness that lying constitutes unethical conduct 
(a violation of the highest order),51 but also by giving the witness an 
example of what constitutes an acceptable, cooperative answer: 
I want you to cooperate fully and to volunteer any information 
relevant to the question.  For example, if I ask you whether you 
received a free T-Shirt on your visit, and you received a sweatshirt 
or any other free items of apparel, I expect you to volunteer that in-
formation.52
This example from an interview is representative of what is expected 
during all phases of an investigation.  Similarly, unlike a party to civil 
litigation, an institution with an incriminating document must dis-
close it—even if it is not requested—as the Bylaws impose a continu-
ing duty to self-police and report violations.53  This duty to disclose 
ensures that the COI can consider all relevant information, and is 
quite different from most civil proceedings in the United States, 
where the adversarial system is entrenched.  The institution, in its de-
fense of an NCAA infractions case, has a duty similar to the Brady v. 
Maryland54 disclosure requirement imposed only on the prosecution 
in our criminal-justice system.  Under Brady, a prosecutor must dis-
close to the accused all evidence material to guilt or punishment, 
whether exculpatory or not.55  The Brady disclosure requirement is 
justified because the prosecutor’s ultimate interest is to uphold jus-
 49 Id. at Bylaws 19.1.3, 32.1.4. 
 50 Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals 
for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1331 (1978). 
 51 See NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 10.1(d) (designating dishonest 
communication with the NCAA regarding a possible rules violation as unethical con-
duct). 
 52 The instruction that appears in the text is a paraphrased example from on-
campus interviews at Baylor. 
 53 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 54 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 55 Id. at 87. 
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tice, not to obtain a conviction.56  This same principle of full disclo-
sure and its greater purpose also apply to NCAA members, who agree 
to embrace the NCAA policies and rules as their own.57
This counterintuitive duty to cooperate repeatedly surfaces and 
must shape the lawyer’s view of the entire enforcement process.  A 
lawyer accustomed to the civil justice system might ask how she can 
fulfill the duty of zealously representing the client while aggressively 
and intentionally uncovering facts that show the client violated the 
Bylaws.  Surely the uncover-the-truth mindset is merely stated with a 
wink and a nod, right?  It would be a mistake to so view it.  The insti-
tution has agreed to be part of a voluntary association, one that im-
poses the duty to cooperate and self-police.  The institution has 
promised to do both.  The client is the institution, and the lawyer’s 
job is to help the institution fulfill its promise; the client is not the ac-
cused person, the targeted sport program, or the fans.58  Zealous ad-
vocacy is not a permissible justification for rationalizing misrepresen-
tations or shirking the obligation to honor an institution’s promises 
to self-police, investigate, and disclose. 
An additional incentive also exists: willing cooperation may miti-
gate penalties if any are later imposed.59  For example, Baylor avoided 
the likely imposition of the “death penalty”—a total ban on men’s 
basketball competition for a set time period60—because of the univer-
sity’s cooperation and sincere and frank approach to the internal in-
 56 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) (citing Berger v. United States, 
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
 57 See NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at art. 1.3.2. 
 58 During our interview with Rick Evrard, he emphasized the importance of in-
dependence, noting that his firm is generally hired by the institution’s chief execu-
tive officer or general counsel, and will not be tied to any program, coach, or athlet-
ics director.  Interview with Richard J. Evrard, Attorney, Sports Law Div., Bond, 
Schoeneck & King, PLLC, in Overland Park, Kan. (Dec. 7, 2006). 
 59 University cooperation in an investigation is one of seven factors considered to 
determine whether a post-season ban is appropriate.  Keegan, supra note 9, at 327 
n.246 (citing Infractions Case Appeal: University of Mississippi, NCAA Register, May 1, 
1995, at § VI.B (a 1995 infractions case appeal by the University of Mississippi)); see 
also NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.2.1.2 (“Self-disclosure shall be consid-
ered in establishing penalties, and, if an institution uncovers a violation prior to its 
being reported to the NCAA and/or its conference, such disclosure shall be consid-
ered as a mitigating factor in determining the penalty.”). 
 60 The term “death penalty” does not appear in the Bylaws.  See generally NCAA 
Manual, supra note 14.  Rather, that term is used colloquially to describe what is re-
ferred to in the Bylaws as program suspension for a defined time period. 
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vestigation.61  The NCAA likewise has embraced a renewed commit-
ment to cooperate rather than intimidate.62
The duty to cooperate, of course, does not mean the lawyer will 
never, or even infrequently, serve in an adversarial role.  Sometimes, 
the candid search for the truth will result in disagreement about what 
is found.  That is, perhaps the enforcement staff and the institution 
will go to trial before the COI to dispute facts and the lawyer will en-
ter adversarial mode, not to hide the truth, but rather to advocate to 
the COI that the candid investigation has revealed facts that do not 
match up with the charges.  For example, during a case involving 
Baylor’s football program in 2000, an aggressive internal investigation 
raised serious questions about the facts supporting the primary alle-
gations.63  Ultimately, Baylor prevailed before the COI, convincing 
the COI that the source of allegedly improper payments was not as 
alleged—a classic case of “who done it.”64  Or, the staff and institution 
might agree on what events transpired, but disagree about whether 
those events constitute the violation alleged.  For example, institu-
tions frequently challenge a violation’s classification as major rather 
than secondary—putting the lawyer in an adversarial role to argue 
that the facts and the law do not match up.65  Or perhaps later in the 
process, the lawyer might represent the institution on appeal to argue 
that the sentence imposed by the COI does not fit the violation.66  
Thus, while the process starts cooperatively, with both the enforce-
ment staff and the institution pursing the same goal of finding out 
what happened, the lawyer’s adversarial role may arise at several 
stages after the investigation. 
3. Other Features 
A brisk preview of other important features of the enforcement 
process follows.  The enforcement staff possesses the power to grant 
 61 Eric Hoover, NCAA Penalizes Baylor U. for Multiple Rules Violations, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., July 8, 2005, at 33 (quoting Gene A. Marsh, then-chairman of the Di-
vision I COI). 
 62 See Brad Wolverton, The New Face of Enforcement, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 11, 
2005, at 39.  It should be noted, however, that merely cooperating will not result in 
“extra credit,” since an institution has an absolute obligation to cooperate.  E-mail 
from Jo Potuto, Chair, NCAA Div. I COI, to Mike Rogers, Professor of Law, Baylor 
Law School (Jan. 31, 2007, 10:21 P.M.) (on file with authors).  The credit for cooper-
ating comes from going the “extra mile.”  Id. 
 63 See infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 64 See infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 65 See infra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 66 See Hoover, supra note 61, at 33 (the Baylor University men’s basketball team 
avoided the death penalty in the recent 2005 major-infractions investigation). 
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use immunity in some situations.67  Few formal evidentiary rules apply 
in adversarial proceedings before the COI, and the existing rules are 
broad enough to be fairly characterized as allowing in the evidence 
the COI wants to consider, which essentially then makes all evidence 
“admissible.”68  The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply.  In-
stead, the Bylaws impose a much broader obligation that makes insti-
tutions responsible for all persons who are representatives of the in-
stitution’s athletics interest.  Thus, no frolic-and-detour or course-
and-scope-of-employment exceptions exist in enforcement proceed-
ings as they would if any entity were being sued for actions of its 
agents in a civil court.69
4. In Context: High Stakes, Unfamiliar Game 
Bylaw 19.5 lists the potential penalties for major violations.70  
Those penalties range from severe to devastating.  And even before a 
formal investigation begins, preliminary allegations of a major infrac-
tion will start the wolves howling and consume the university.  The 
media will flood the campus and hound officials with inquiries.  The 
allegations will often dominate public discussion—both within the in-
stitution’s community and externally.  Just as importantly, rapacious 
competitors will seize the allegations as a negative recruiting advan-
tage. 
Having provided the context needed to appreciate the forth-
coming nuances, we now step back and start with our phone call from 
the introduction.  As we proceed, we will examine what the lawyer 
can do, and debate what she should do, with focus on the lawyer’s 
roles as both investigator and advocate.  Always looming will be the 
seeming tension between the ethical duty of zealous representation 
and the enforcement staff’s expectation of full cooperation.  And we 
will detour often to tell stories for context, whether necessary, help-
ful, or just plain interesting. 
 67 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.3.8; Frequently Asked Questions 
About the NCAA Enforcement Process (Nov. 16, 2005), http://www.ncaa.org/ 
enforcement/faq_enforcement.html (question fourteen related to immunity for 
coaches and athletes). 
 68 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.8.7.4; see infra Section III.A. 
 69 The university is responsible for its staff members and for any individual or or-
ganization that promotes the school’s athletics program.  NCAA Manual, supra note 
14, at art. 2.1.2.  Liability even exists for the actions of some outside, independent 
individuals or organizations.  Id. at arts. 6.4.1–.2. 
 70 Id. at Bylaw 19.5. 
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II. THE INVESTIGATIVE STAGE 
In our introductory hypothetical, ESPN seeks immediate com-
ment about a major-infractions allegation.  Such calls are trouble-
some, of course, because they often catch the recipient off guard, re-
quiring a response before any opportunity for investigation.  “The 
story airs at 6 P.M.,” a news reporter might state during a 4:45 P.M. 
phone conversation.  Information about potential violations can 
reach the institution in several ways.  It could be, as hypothesized, a 
media member seeking comment.  Other times, information about a 
potential violation first reaches the institution from the NCAA, as it is 
not uncommon for a rival fan or institution to allege violations di-
rectly to the NCAA, which then triggers the enforcement staff’s duty 
to investigate.71  Or, commonly, the infractions process begins when 
an institution self-reports a potential violation after having received a 
tip from persons connected with the institution or after having un-
covered a violation through its own ongoing monitoring efforts.72  
Regardless of how the information reaches the institution, the infor-
mation cannot be ignored.  This Section details the many decisions 
that accompany how to investigate potential violations. 
On a cautionary note: during the infractions process generally, 
but especially during the investigation, the institution must be aware 
of other legal obligations regarding students and student-athletes.  
For example, institutions must navigate academic privacy laws73 and 
sunshine laws.74  Also, the institution should consider the work prod-
uct doctrine, which shelters the findings of an attorney’s investigation 
in preparation for her client’s trial from discovery inquiries,75 state 
 71 Id. at Bylaw 32.2.1. 
 72 See id. at Bylaw 32.2.1.2 (establishing that self-disclosure shall be considered in 
establishing penalties).  Even in regard to a secondary violation, self-reporting dem-
onstrates the institution’s integrity and evidences the level of institutional control.  
Wendy Guthrie, Editorial, Handling of Violations Reveals Character, NCAA NEWS, Oct. 
23, 2006, at 4. 
 73 Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking up Buckley II: Using Civil Rights Claims to Enforce the 
Federal Student Records Statute, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 29, 29 (1997) (“As a condition of 
receiving federal education funds, [the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act] 
requires schools to provide parents of minor pre-college students, and adult and col-
lege students, access to their school records, confidentiality in those records, and an 
opportunity to challenge their accuracy.”). 
 74 John F. O’Connor & Michael J. Baratz, Some Assembly Required: The Application of 
State Open Meeting Laws to Email Correspondence, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 719, 719 (2004) 
(noting that open records and meetings acts in all fifty states provide transparency to 
governmental functions). 
 75 David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The 
Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 150 
(2000). 
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and federal criminal statutes, the potential for civil liability, such as 
defamation and breach of contract suits,76 and eligibility issues.77
In this Section, we will proceed ostensibly perhaps a bit out of 
order to provide the context necessary to make the preliminary deci-
sions.  First, we detail how the Bylaws regulate investigations and es-
tablish formal procedures such as the Notice of Inquiry and the No-
tice of Allegations.  Then, having outlined what’s to come, we return 
to some of the details and strategic choices—all considered within 
the context of the duty to cooperate and self-police.  Finally, we will 
add perspective and illustration by telling a small part of our own war 
story, the all-too-familiar men’s basketball case at Baylor University 
that dominated headlines. 
A. Formal Procedures 
As noted, we address only major-infractions cases.78  The Bylaws 
define major infractions as “[a]ll violations other than secondary vio-
lations . . .  specifically including those that provide an extensive re-
cruiting or competitive advantage.”79  Conversely, “[a] secondary vio-
lation is a violation that is isolated or inadvertent [sic] in nature, 
provides or is intended to provide only a minimal recruiting, com-
petitive or other advantage[,] and does not include any significant 
recruiting inducement or extra benefit.”80  Secondary violations are 
frequently processed through the institution’s conference and in-
volve different, less formal procedures.81
 76 For example, former Ohio State University men’s basketball Head Coach Jim 
O’Brien recovered nearly $2.5 million for wrongful termination.  O’Brien v. Ohio 
State Univ., No. 2004-10230, 2006 WL 2615550, at *2 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Aug. 18, 2006).  
The university fired O’Brien after self-reporting to the NCAA a violation O’Brien 
committed, but eleven months before the university received a Notice of Allegations 
from the NCAA.  O’Brien v. Ohio State Univ., No. 2004-10230, 2006 WL 571043, at 
*4–5 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Feb. 15, 2006).  The University has appealed the decision, and 
eighteen other universities and three Division I conferences filed supporting briefs.  
Press Release, Ohio State Univ., Ohio State Files Brief in O’Brien Appeal (Nov. 20, 
2006), http://www.osu.edu/news/newsitem1525. 
 77 A separate body within the NCAA, distinct from the COI or enforcement staff, 
makes decisions regarding initial eligibility.  See Gary R. Roberts, Resolution of Disputes 
in Intercollegiate Athletics, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 431, 439 (2001); see also infra Section 
II.A.3. 
 78 Major-infractions cases proceed differently from secondary cases in several 
ways.  For example, the enforcement staff is bifurcated.  Part of the staff is assigned 
solely to process secondary violations.  Matheson, supra note 20. 
 79 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 19.02.2.2. 
 80 Id. at Bylaw 19.02.2.1. 
 81 Id. at Bylaw 32.4.1-32.4.4.  See, for example, the different procedures for ap-
pealing penalties imposed by the enforcement staff for secondary violations at Bylaw 
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When the enforcement staff receives notice of a potential major 
infraction, the Bylaws impose a duty to investigate82 according to the 
procedures established by the COI.83  The Bylaws require that the en-
forcement staff make “reasonable efforts” to process infractions mat-
ters in a timely manner84 and that any enforcement staff member with 
an actual or apparent conflict of interest must recuse himself from 
the matter.85  The enforcement staff is empowered to conduct pre-
liminary interviews before it proceeds to the first formal step, the No-
tice of Inquiry.86  Bylaw 32.3 also defines additional procedural re-
quirements and protections that apply during the investigation: 
• presence of institutional representatives during on-campus in-
terviews;87 
• avoiding conflicts with academic schedules;88 
• ability to grant limited immunity;89 and 
• recording interviews and record keeping.90 
The next three subsections detail three major parts of investiga-
tions.  The first two subsections, covering the Notice of Inquiry and 
the Notice of Allegations, discuss two formal procedures that mark 
major events during the investigative stage.  The third subsection dis-
cusses the myriad uses of self-reports. 
1. The Notice of Inquiry 
After its preliminary investigation, if the enforcement staff has 
developed “reasonably reliable information” that an institution has 
violated the rules, and determines that the matter requires further 
investigation, the enforcement staff must issue a Notice of Inquiry.91  
The enforcement staff sends the Notice of Inquiry to the institution’s 
32.4.4, and the direction that the enforcement staff should promptly handle secon-
dary matters by correspondence with the institution, at Bylaw 32.2.2.1.3. 
 82 Id. at Bylaw 32.2.1.1. 
 83 Id. at Bylaw 32.2.1. 
 84 Id. at Bylaw 32.3.2.  The enforcement staff recently increased its size and reor-
ganized to speed along cases.  Gary T. Brown, Re-enforcement, NCAA NEWS, June 21, 
2004, at 1. 
 85 NCAA, Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.3.3. 
 86 Id. at Bylaw 32.2.2.1.1. 
 87 Id. at Bylaw 32.3.4.1. 
 88 Id. at Bylaw 32.3.4.2. 
 89 Id. at Bylaw 32.3.8. 
 90 Id. at Bylaw 32.3.9. 
 91 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.5.1.  Major-infractions cases (or po-
tential cases at this point in the process) garner media attention even at this early 
stage.  See Brian Davis & Gary Jacobson, NCAA Looking into Violations: OU Could Receive 
Penalties for the Actions of Bomar, Quinn, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 14, 2006, at 6C. 
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chief executive officer (“CEO”) and advises the CEO that the en-
forcement staff will engage in an investigation.92  The Notice of In-
quiry is not an allegation or charge; rather, it merely informs the in-
stitution of a formal investigation and triggers certain procedural 
requirements. The Notice of Inquiry must contain, to the extent pos-
sible, eight categories of information: 
• the involved sport; 
• the approximate time period during which the alleged viola-
tions occurred; 
• the identity of involved individuals; 
• an approximate time frame for the investigation; 
• a statement indicating that the institution and involved indi-
viduals may be represented by legal counsel at all stages of the 
proceedings; 
• a statement requesting that the individuals associated with the 
institution not discuss the case prior to interviews by the en-
forcement staff and institution except for reasonable campus 
communications not intended to impede the investigation of 
the allegations and except for consultation with legal counsel; 
• a statement indicating that other facts may be developed dur-
ing the course of the investigation that may relate to addi-
tional violations; and 
• a statement regarding the obligation of the institution to co-
operate in the case. 93 
Two time limits guide the enforcement staff.94  The staff must in-
form the institution of the status of the inquiry within six months 
from when the CEO receives the Notice of Inquiry from the en-
forcement staff.95  And, if the inquiry has not been processed to con-
clusion within one year after the CEO receives the Notice of Inquiry, 
the staff must review the status of the case with the COI, and the COI 
will determine whether further investigation is warranted, with no-
tices being sent to the institution at six-month intervals.96
 92 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.5.1. 
 93 Id. at Bylaw 32.5.1(a)–(h). 
 94 In a recent presentation on enforcement procedures, Dan Matheson, the 
NCAA associate director of enforcement, noted that these deadlines were adopted to 
facilitate the association’s goal to limit investigations to one year (from start until the 
Notice of Allegations or summary disposition letter).  Matheson, supra note 20.  From 
2000 to 2003, the average investigation lasted more than eighteen months.  Id.  After 
the NCAA adopted the timelines, the investigations dropped to slightly more than 
eight months on average—a ten-month difference.  Id. 
 95 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.5.1.1. 
 96 Id. at Bylaw 32.5.1.2. 
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Depending upon the information developed, the investigation 
following the Notice of Inquiry will yield one of two results.  First, the 
enforcement staff might proceed to issue its formal charges in the 
form of a Notice of Allegations.97  Or, if the information warrants, it 
may drop the charges and notify the institution that the matter is 
closed.98  The standard for whether the Notice of Allegations should 
be issued is vague and practically circular, directing the staff to issue a 
Notice of Allegations when the information developed is “sufficient” 
to warrant a Notice of Allegations,99 and to drop the investigation 
when the information is not of “sufficient substance” to warrant a No-
tice of Allegations.100  The enforcement staff is obligated to issue a 
Notice of Allegations when it “believes there is sufficient information 
to conclude that the Committee on Infractions could make a find-
ing.”101
This standard is facially problematic and should be amended be-
cause it does not comport with current or desirable practice.  The By-
laws require that the staff shall issue a Notice of Allegations if the COI 
“could make a finding.”102  Literally then, if the staff believes there is a 
one in a thousand chance that the COI will make a finding, it shall 
proceed with formal charges and the resource expenditure that ac-
companies the trial.  Complicating this matter is the requirement that 
the staff determines whether the COI could make a finding, but the 
Bylaws do not define what the burden of persuasion is at the COI 
trial.103  The Bylaws do not clarify how likely a finding must be or what 
constitutes information “sufficient” enough to reach a finding.  Not 
surprisingly, the enforcement staff exercises more discretion than the 
Bylaws suggest exist, generally following an informal policy of only 
bringing charges when it thinks the COI will likely find a violation, 
and being especially careful before bringing charges of unethical 
conduct since those charges bring a lasting stigma even if no finding 
is made.104
We suggest two potential amendments.  First, the Bylaws might 
simply be amended to change the “shall” to a “may,” thus recognizing 
 97 Id. at Bylaw 32.6.1. 
 98 Id. at Bylaw 32.5.2. 
 99 Id. at Bylaw 32.6.1. 
 100 Id. at Bylaw 32.5.2. 
 101 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.6.1.1.1. 
 102 Id. (emphasis added). 
 103 See infra Section III.A. 
 104 Telephone interview with David Price, Vice President for Enforcement Servs., 
NCAA & Thomas C. Hosty, Dir. of Enforcement, NCAA (Jan. 3, 2007). 
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that the enforcement staff has discretion to consider practicalities, 
likelihood of success, and wise resource allocation when the COI 
could make a finding.  Or second, if the Bylaws are going to impose a 
duty on the enforcement staff to issue a Notice of Allegations under 
certain circumstances, perhaps the standard could be borrowed from 
the law of materiality in the Securities Regulation context: The en-
forcement staff must issue a Notice of Allegations when it discovers 
evidence that would cause a reasonable person to conclude that such 
evidence creates a substantial likelihood that the COI would make a 
finding.105  Thus, evidence that supports a very low percentage chance 
of a finding by the COI would not meet the proposed standard. 
Practically, a third result of the investigation is also common.  In-
formation developed during the investigation may reveal to the staff 
and institution that the violation occurred.  The progress toward 
summary disposition then might begin, even before the issuance of 
the formal Notice of Allegations. 
A brief pause is needed to orient ourselves.  Somehow, whether 
through self-reporting or otherwise, the NCAA has received some in-
formation.  After a quick look around, the enforcement staff decided 
to investigate and issued a Notice of Inquiry.  Then, after investigat-
ing further, the enforcement staff decides whether to pursue formal 
charges in the form of a Notice of Allegations.  Formal adversarial 
proceedings begin if the COI issues a Notice of Allegations.106
2. The Notice of Allegations 
The Notice of Allegations resembles formal charges.  The staff 
must send the Notice of Allegations to the CEO (with copies to the 
FAR and athletics director).107  The Notice of Allegations must list the 
Bylaws alleged to have been violated and the details of each allega-
tion,108 and the cover letter accompanying the notice must:  
• inform the president or chancellor of the matter under inquiry 
and request the cooperation of the institution in obtaining all 
 105 Cf. TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976) (noting that 
some circuits define materiality in securities fraud actions to include any facts that a 
reasonable shareholder might consider important). 
 106 One commentator notes that once a Notice of Allegation issues, it would be 
rare for a hearing to completely exonerate the institution.  Roberts, supra note 77, at 
437.  Baylor once succeeded in joining that rare class, having successfully obtained a 
no-violation finding from the COI in 2000 after an investigation into the Baylor foot-
ball program. 
 107 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.6.1. 
 108 Id. at Bylaw 32.6.1.2. 
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the pertinent facts and provide specific information on how 
to investigate the allegation;109 
• request the president or chancellor to respond to the allega-
tions and to provide all relevant information which the insti-
tution has, or may reasonably obtain, including information 
uncovered related to new violations;110 
• request the president or chancellor and other institutional staff 
to appear before the committee at a time and place deter-
mined by the committee;111 
• inform the president or chancellor that if the institution fails 
to appear after having been requested to do so, it may not ap-
peal the committee’s findings of fact and violations, or the re-
sultant penalty;112 
• direct the institution to provide to any present or former insti-
tutional staff member(s) who were notified in writing of an al-
legation in which they were named by the enforcement staff, 
and any present or former student-athletes whose eligibility 
could be affected based on involvement in an alleged viola-
tion, the opportunity to submit in writing any information the 
individual desires that is relevant to the allegation in ques-
tion;113 and 
• inform the president or chancellor that the enforcement staff’s 
primary investigator in the case will be available to discuss the 
development of its response and assist in locating various in-
dividuals who have, or may have, important information re-
garding the allegations.114 
After the institution receives the Notice of Allegations, whether 
or not the institution chooses to fight the charges, it will prepare a 
written response.115  The response may deny all charges, or it may 
admit all charges and serve as a step toward summary disposition.  
More commonly, the response will more closely resemble an answer 
filed in federal court litigation, admitting the truth of some facts or 
allegations and disputing some facts and “legal” conclusions.  Typi-
cally, this response will assert one or more of four common claims: 
 109 Id. at Bylaw 32.6.1.1(a). 
 110 Id. at Bylaw 32.6.1.1(b). 
 111 Id. at Bylaw 32.6.1.1(c). 
 112 Id. at Bylaw 32.6.1.1(d). 
 113 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.6.1.1(e). 
 114 Id. at Bylaw 32.6.1.1(f). 
 115 See id. at Bylaw 32.6.5. 
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(1) the evidence is insufficient to support the facts alleged;116 (2) the 
undisputed facts do not amount to a violation;117 (3) the violation al-
leged is secondary rather than major;118 and (4) the cumulative viola-
tions do not constitute a loss of institutional control.119  This response 
must be on file with the COI and the enforcement staff within ninety 
days of the institution’s receipt of the Notice of Allegations, unless 
the COI grants an extension.120
 116 In 2000, Baylor successfully argued to the COI that there was insufficient evi-
dence to support the allegation that an assistant football coach provided a recruiting 
inducement to a potential player.  The COI accepted this argument and dismissed 
the allegation under Bylaw 32.7.6.2, which states that “the committee shall base its 
findings on information presented to it that it determines to be credible, persuasive 
and of a kind on which reasonably prudent persons rely in the conduct of serious af-
fairs.”  Committee on Infractions, Baylor University Public Infractions Report (Dec. 
21, 2000), http://www.ncaa.org/releases/infractions/2000/2000122101in.htm. 
 117 The University of Utah made this argument in a 2003 case in which the en-
forcement staff alleged academic fraud.  A student tutor employed by the athletic 
department wrote a paper for two football players who each turned in the paper as 
his own.  The tutor was not assigned to either of the athletes who received the paper, 
nor was she designated as a writing tutor.  The writing instructor noticed the dupli-
cate papers and gave each student a failing grade and reported the incident, and the 
athletic department fired the tutor.  The institution insisted that the tutor acted as a 
friend to the student-athletes, rather than in her capacity as a tutor, and also empha-
sized that the University took prompt action when officials discovered what hap-
pened.  The COI disagreed, and held the institution responsible for academic fraud.  
Committee on Infractions, University of Utah Public Infractions Report (July 30, 
2003),  http://www.ncaa.org/releases/infractions/2003073001in.htm. 
 118 Baylor set forth this argument in the 2000 enforcement case when post-eligible 
athletes on the men’s tennis team subsidized rent payments to fellow athletes.  De-
spite the University’s claim that the coach merely suggested the athletes make the 
payments—a secondary violation—the COI found that the athletes felt they had to 
make the payments at the coach’s insistence—a major infraction.  Committee on In-
fractions, Baylor University Public Infractions Report (Dec. 21, 2000), 
http://www.ncaa.org/releases/infractions/2000/2000122101in.htm. 
 119 The University of Oklahoma successfully argued that improper telephone con-
tacts by the men’s basketball coaching staff did not constitute a loss of institutional 
control, but rather that the individual violations warranted the lesser charge of fail-
ure to monitor.  Committee on Infractions, University of Oklahoma Public Infrac-
tions Report (May 25, 2006), http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/media_and_events/ 
press_room/2006/may/20060525_oklahoma_infractions_report2.pdf.  The COI re-
jected a similar argument from the University of Kansas regarding its football and 
men’s basketball teams.  Committee on Infractions, University of Kansas Public In-
fractions Report (Oct. 12, 2006), http:// www2.ncaa.org/portal/media_and 
events/press_room/2006/October/20061012_kansas_infractions_report.pdf. 
 120 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.6.5.  The authority of the COI to 
grant an extension is yet another reason to strike a cooperative tone.  Baylor and the 
NCAA agreed to a structured deadline schedule in which Baylor was to provide hun-
dreds of pages of response in pieces, with the full submission completed before a fi-
nal deadline.  This allowed Baylor officials additional time to construct the univer-
sity’s response, but also provided something for the enforcement staff to work on in 
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The adversarial process continues with the preliminary confer-
ence, which must occur within thirty days of an institution’s submis-
sion of its response.121  This conference (which is sometimes con-
ducted by phone122) is attended by institutional representatives and 
the enforcement staff, and its purpose is to “clarify the issues to be 
discussed in the case during the hearing [before the COI], make 
suggestions regarding additional investigation or interviews that 
should be conducted by the institution to supplement its response 
and identify allegations that the staff intends to withdraw.”123  It is also 
worth noting that due to the informality of the investigative process 
(as compared to discovery in civil litigation) the prehearing confer-
ence often produces surprises and may reshape the case.  For exam-
ple, an institution may prepare for the hearing having disputed a fact 
only to learn at the prehearing conference that a witness has unex-
pectedly admitted a fact or suddenly found a document.  In such 
situations, the procedures are flexible enough to allow the institution 
to amend its response.124  Following the prehearing conference, the 
enforcement staff prepares the NCAA Enforcement Staff Summary 
Case Statement, which is discussed earlier in this Article.125
An institution may choose not to fight the charges, however, and 
may choose the summary disposition procedures if the institution is 
not a “repeat violator,” as the Bylaws define that term.126  If, as we sug-
gested, the Notice of Allegations is analogous to formal charges, the 
summary disposition procedure is analogous to a plea bargain, but 
with an important difference.127  The difference is that when an insti-
tution chooses summary disposition, it must agree to the charges but 
the interim.  In addition, this prevented any delay in the hearing date because the 
enforcement staff began work far before the ultimate deadline. 
 121 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.6.6. 
 122 The enforcement staff also has the capacity to conduct the preliminary confer-
ence via videoconferencing.  E-mail from Thomas C. Hosty, Director of Enforce-
ment, NCAA, to Mike Rogers, Professor of Law, Baylor Law School (Feb. 21, 2007, 
10:16 A.M.) (on file with authors). 
 123 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.6.6. 
 124 See id. at Bylaw 32.6.5. 
 125 Id. at Bylaw 32.6.7; see supra, Section I.B.1. 
 126 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.7.1.  The Bylaws define a repeat vio-
lator as an institution that commits a major violation “within five years of the starting 
date of a major penalty.”  Id. at Bylaw 19.5.2.3.1.  The relevant time is the commission 
of the violation, not when an investigation begins or hearing takes place.  Id. 
 127 In a plea bargain, a prosecutor and defendant strike an agreement that the de-
fendant will plead guilty to an offense—usually a lesser offense or just one of multi-
ple charges—and the prosecutor agrees to pursue a lesser sentence or drop addi-
tional charges.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 531 (2d pocket ed. 2001). 
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not to the penalty.128  When an institution chooses summary disposi-
tion, it coordinates with the enforcement staff to file a written report 
that contains proposed, agreed-upon findings of fact; a summary of 
information upon which those findings are based; a stipulation that 
the proposed findings are substantially correct; a stipulation that the 
findings violate NCAA legislation; and if applicable, a statement of 
unresolved issues that are not considered substantial enough to affect 
the outcome of the case.129  Nothing in the written report requires an 
agreed-upon stipulation of the penalty.  Instead, the institution and 
involved individuals submit proposed penalties within the guidelines 
set forth in the Bylaws’ penalty structures, along with a statement dis-
cussing any mitigating factors.  The enforcement staff is not involved 
in the penalty-proposal process.130
The COI then reviews the joint report and reaches one of three 
conclusions.  First, if it accepts the findings, conclusions, and penal-
ties, it prepares a written report, submits the report to the institution, 
and then publicly announces the resolution.131  Second, the COI may 
reject the findings, which essentially removes the case from summary 
disposition and triggers a full hearing before the COI.132  Finally, if 
the COI accepts the findings but rejects the institution’s proposed 
penalties, the institution and involved individuals may elect to par-
ticipate in an expedited hearing during which the only issue will be 
the penalty.133  If the institution participates in an expedited hearing, 
it can later appeal the penalty to the Infractions Appeals Commit-
tee.134
As to whether to accept the joint report, the COI serves much 
more than a ministerial role.  The COI has two obligations: (1) fair-
ness to the institution and (2) fairness to other member institutions 
that will be harmed if the infracting institution is allowed to avoid a 
thorough investigation of its conduct.135  For this reason, the joint re-
port must not only contain admissions and agreement, but it must 
 128 See NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaws 32.7.1.2–3. 
 129 Id. at Bylaw 32.7.1.2. 
 130 See Heller, supra note 9, at 306–07. 
 131 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.7.1.4.1. 
 132 Id. at Bylaw 32.7.1.4.2. 
 133 Id. at Bylaw 32.7.1.4.3.  It should be noted that, ordinarily, an institution will be 
given a second—but not a third—chance at proposing penalties if the COI rejects 
the first attempt.  Interview with Richard J. Evrard, Attorney, Sports Law Div., Bond, 
Schoeneck & King, PLLC, in Overland Park, Kan. (Dec. 7, 2006). 
 134 Heller, supra note 9, at 306.  See also NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 
32.7.1.4.3. 
 135 Telephone interview with Jo Potuto, Chair, NCAA Div. I COI (Jan. 2, 2007). 
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also convince the COI that the investigation has been thorough and 
that the COI is effectively maintaining the level playing field for the 
other member institutions whose interests it protects.136
Before turning to the strategic questions involved with the inves-
tigative stage, a brief note is needed on another potential step in the 
process which is not explicitly provided for in the Bylaws. 
3. Self-Reports 
Although not a formal procedure under the Bylaws, there is a 
document—the self-report—that can be prepared and filed by the in-
stitution before the Notice of Allegations process begins at the NCAA 
headquarters in Indianapolis.  Once an investigation begins in ear-
nest and the enforcement staff and institution have established a co-
operative relationship (before or after a Notice of Inquiry), the insti-
tution should weigh the merits of filing a self-report.  If the choice is 
made to file one, the institution should tell the staff right away.  Dur-
ing our interview with representatives of the enforcement staff, they 
explained that, while they appreciate the institution’s willingness to 
file a self-report, the staff wants to stay involved in the process.137  By 
keeping the staff involved in the process, an institution will not only 
garner goodwill and credit for cooperation and self-reporting, it will 
also prevent duplicative steps that will likely arise if the enforcement 
staff is not part of the investigation. 
While self-reporting has traditionally been standard procedure 
in secondary cases, it has become a more common practice in major 
cases.  A comprehensive self-report can serve as a key component to a 
strong institutional response.  This step assures credit for the viola-
tions self-discovered and reported by the institution.  The self-report 
advances efficiency in many respects, as the staff will turn the viola-
tions self-reported into allegations requiring a response, and the re-
sponse will essentially be reworking the self-report.138  The decision 
regarding whether to self-report revolves largely around the same 
concerns discussed in the next subsection, namely whether the insti-
tution has the time and internal resources to prepare the self-report 
 136 Id. 
 137 Telephone interview with David Price, Vice President for Enforcement Servs., 
NCAA, & Thomas C. Hosty, Dir. of Enforcement, NCAA (Jan. 3, 2007). 
 138 Of course the staff will add to the Notice of Allegations any violations discov-
ered but not self-reported. 
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or whether it has the resources to hire an outside firm that specializes 
in NCAA compliance matters.139
Part and parcel to a self-report that admits violations is the impo-
sition of sanctions by the institution.  The COI will accept the self-
imposed sanctions and will add additional penalties if it believes the 
institution did not adequately penalize itself.  Some institutions 
choose to wait on penalties and argue for leniency at the hearing, 
rather than risk over self-penalization.  While the fear of over self-
penalization is worth consideration, it ultimately does not justify 
withholding the penalties for two reasons.  First, the COI looks fa-
vorably upon institutions who self-impose penalties.140  Second, the 
COI has made clear that over self-penalization is not irrevocable.  For 
example, in the most recent case involving the University of Kansas, 
the COI regarded sanctions self-imposed upon the women’s basket-
ball program as “wholly disproportionate” considering the viola-
tions.141  The COI implied that it would have rescinded the self-
imposed sanctions had they not already been executed on the pro-
gram.142
What penalties to self-impose?  The starting place is the major-
infractions database143 and the Bylaws.144  What are the potential pen-
alties, and what penalties has the COI imposed in similar cases?  Here 
is another area where an outside consultant can help by providing 
dispassionate expertise.145  An institution’s conference commissioner 
also provides another source for dispassionate recommendations. 
 139 Some of these firms recommend a package of services that include both a fac-
tual investigation and filing of a self-report. 
 140 In Baylor’s recent basketball case, for example, self-imposed sanctions later 
served as a mitigating factor when the COI imposed penalties.  Committee on Infrac-
tions, Baylor University Public Infractions Report (Jun. 23, 2005), 
https://goomer.ncaa.org/wdbctx/LSDBi/LSDBi.MajorInfPackage.ProcessMultipleB
ylaws?p_Multiple=0&p_PK=602&p_Button=View+Public+Report&p_TextTerms=This
IsADummyPhraseThatWillNoBeDuplcated&p_TextTerms2=ThisIsADummyPhrase 
ThatWillNotBeDuplicated&p_Division=1 [hereinafter Baylor Infractions Report—
2005] (“[O]nce the violations finally came to light Baylor University took decisive 
and meaningful action to stop the violations and to punish itself and the involved 
individuals . . . .  The committee has carefully evaluated the university’s self-imposed 
penalties and corrective actions.”). 
 141 Committee on Infractions, University of Kansas Public Infractions Report  
(Oct. 12, 2006), http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/media_and_events/press_room/ 
2006/october/20061012_kansas_infractions_report.pdf. 
 142 Id. 
 143 A publicly accessible version is available at http://www.ncaa.org. 
 144 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 19.5.2. 
 145 Joe Drape, Facing N.C.A.A., The Best Defense Is a Legal Team, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
2007, at 1. 
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Corrective measures tied to violations should also be developed 
and reported to the staff and COI.  For example, the recent case in-
volving excessive phone calls to prospects made by former basketball 
coaches at the University of Oklahoma led to the development of a 
state-of-the-art telephone monitoring system.146
If the investigation reveals conduct that has rendered a student-
athlete ineligible, certain action is mandatory.  Usually ineligibility is 
caused by a prospect’s receipt of an improper recruiting inducement 
or an enrolled student-athlete having been provided an impermissi-
ble extra benefit.  If the violation is de minimis ($100 or less), mere 
reimbursement (a donation to charity equal to the amount of the 
impropriety) and notification solve the problem.147  If the violation is 
not de minimis, the more structured reinstatement process is indi-
cated.148  An institution in violation should work with the institution’s 
compliance staff.  Reinstatement requests should be grist of the mill 
for them.  Most importantly, and not standard practice, talk to and 
copy the enforcement staff regarding the reinstatement issue.  This is 
a necessary part of cooperation and information sharing during a ma-
jor case.149
In summary, awaiting judgment from the COI is never pleasant.  
However, the institution’s position is certainly stronger if it has 
helped the enforcement staff by investigating and filing a self-report, 
penalized itself for its sins, formulated and adopted its own corrective 
measures, and addressed eligibility issues that have arisen. 
B. Representing the Institution During the Investigative Stage 
From responding to ESPN’s phone call to choosing whether to 
use summary disposition, choices arise throughout this process.  This 
Section explores many of the common choices, and a few not so 
common, in light of the uniqueness of the enforcement proceedings 
 146 See Associated Press, Oklahoma to Meet with NCAA Regarding Violations, 
ESPN.com, Jan. 4, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=2280677. 
 147 See, e.g., NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaws 13.5, 13.6.6, 13.8, 16.01.1.1. 
 148 Id. at Bylaw 14.12. 
 149 If the ineligible student-athlete competed in a NCAA competition (any game 
or match) won by the institution, the issue of vacating the result is raised, particularly 
if the violation is serious enough to result in the loss of competition for the student-
athlete.  For example, the NCAA vacated all titles earned and records achieved by the 
Texas Christian University track teams (including individual achievements) that in-
volved ineligible student-athletes.  Committee on Infractions, Texas Christian Uni-
versity Public Infractions Report (Sept. 22, 2005), http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/me-
dia_and_events/press_room/2005/september/20050922_texaschristian_report.pdf.  
The NCAA also ordered all mention of the vacated achievements rescinded.  Id. 
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and the duty to cooperate.  To be sure, the situation is contentious; 
the reader represents an accused institution and bad things will hap-
pen to the institution if the charges stick.  At times, the person repre-
senting the institution (we refer to this person as a lawyer, if just to 
avoid rhetorical congestion) will assume a traditional adversarial role.  
But not always, and it would be a mistake to cynically view the role of 
truth seeker, for this is not the adversarial legal system and the con-
sequences for those who hide the ball (or at least try not to find it) 
counsel strongly in favor of a sincere effort to honor the institution’s 
promise to self-police.150  The COI may sanction an institution spe-
cifically for a poor internal investigation, even when the enforcement 
staff cannot prove additional violations.151  The University of Ken-
tucky found itself in this unfortunate situation in the mid-1980s after 
the local newspaper reported on alleged violations in the men’s bas-
ketball program.152  The COI publicly reprimanded the university and 
imposed a three-year monitoring plan because the university’s self-
investigation was “inadequate.”153  Specifically, the COI chastised Ken-
tucky for accepting “[g]eneral denials . . . with little, if any, follow-up 
questioning . . . or independent investigation of facts.”154  The COI 
also admonished the university’s written interview requests to former 
student-athletes, which “seemed to suggest, as a viable option, that re-
fusal to be interviewed would be a satisfactory response.”155  The en-
forcement staff admitted, and the COI agreed, that the evidence did 
not support a violation other than this failure to cooperate.156 
1. The Beginning 
The phone caller is seeking immediate comment on a potential 
violation.  Perhaps the story will print tomorrow or air in a few hours.  
What should the response be?  The first response should have already 
occurred.  At the risk of stating the obvious, the first step is to avoid 
the precarious situation that requires the call recipient to make a 
time-pressured and unguided decision about how to respond.  Inves-
 150 An institution’s failure to cooperate constitutes an ethical violation, one of the 
most severe charges that the NCAA can levy against an institution.  See NCAA Man-
ual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 10.1. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Committee on Infractions, University of Kentucky Public Infractions Report 
(Mar. 3, 1988), http://goomer.ncaa.org/wdbctx/lsdbi/LSDBI.lsdbi_menu.home 
page. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
RYANFINAL 4/9/2007  4:51:34 PM 
776 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:749 
 
tigation procedures should be in place long before the phone 
rings.157
The institution should carefully draft a written policy in the rela-
tively carefree pre-allegation period—before the onset of stress-
related medical conditions that are sure to plague university officials 
once the chaos ensues.  The plan should determine who will lead fu-
ture investigations and should pave the road for a rapid, thorough, 
and accurate response. 
A written investigation policy allows a university to move quickly 
once an allegation is made.  Moving quickly is essential (of course not 
at the expense of accuracy or thoroughness).  The media will be 
pounding the institution.  In the recent past, this meant the daily 
printing of a negative story and airing of unpleasant television sports 
reports at six and ten o’clock.  Now, if the case is high profile, articles 
are posted or updated multiple times daily on the internet, message 
boards and internet web logs overflow with gossip, and twenty-four 
hour television and radio get in their licks continuously. 
Written investigation procedures also help send the message to 
witnesses that the investigation is business, not personal.  Because the 
FAR or other institutional representatives involved in the investiga-
tion will know many of the witnesses (coaches, athletics department 
staff members, etc.), there is a prospect of damaging relationships 
unnecessarily or excessively.  It is helpful to truthfully say, “Coach, I 
don’t like asking those questions, but it’s my job.  We have written 
procedures.  The president assigned this responsibility to me before 
these issues existed.”  Thus, it’s not personal, just part of the system. 
Also, a plan that fails to name the investigator may leave the in-
stitution vulnerable to internal and external pressures to select a par-
ticular investigator whose motivation does not coincide with the best 
interests of the university.158  For example, the recommended investi-
gator might be motivated by money or a desire to garner publicity, or 
she may not be experienced in NCAA investigations.  Perhaps the 
greatest concern is that an investigator, selected by a university and 
thrown to wolves after allegations have been made, may desire to ex-
onerate the institution regardless of the facts.  The media will scruti-
 157 Michael Rogers, Editorial, Investigations: Act Before the Wolves Howl, THE NCAA 
NEWS, Oct. 23, 2006, at 4. 
 158 Another critical factor is to whom the investigator will answer.  A diluted chain 
of command can be as ineffective as not having designated an investigator.  Since the 
institution’s president or CEO is ultimately accountable, the investigation will be 
most effective if all reports are funneled directly to the president.  Telephone inter-
view with Richard J. Evrard, Attorney, Sports Law Div., Bond, Schoeneck & King, 
PLLC, Overland Park, Kan. (Dec. 7, 2006). 
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nize the decision, perhaps cynically analyzing the choice.  Institu-
tional leaders should carefully consider merit, impartiality, and per-
ceived impartiality before the phone rings. 
Use of an internal investigation team poses additional issues that 
also are best addressed before allegations surface.  To engender re-
spect internally and externally, the team must have members of stat-
ure within the university community who will accept the vilification 
that will accompany an affirmative finding of violations.  Tenure 
helps.159  Some team members should have expertise in investiga-
tions, preferably on NCAA matters, and they must not be set on see-
ing their names in the paper.  Regardless of whom the institution taps 
to lead the investigation,160 the choice should be made before the 
wolves begin to circle. 
Additional issues that an institution should make during peace-
time and include in the plan are: 
• Who will be the media spokesperson? 
• Who will form the institution’s internal investigation team if 
the institution employs that option? 
• How will internal and outside investigation teams interact if 
the institution uses both? 
• What checks will be established to ensure university policies 
are followed? 
• How will the investigation team handle infractions if any are 
discovered? 
• Who will serve as the liaison with the conference office?161 
While it is relatively easy to identify the choices an institution 
should resolve with the plan, few bright-line answers exist as to the 
correct choices.  The following subsections address some considera-
tions, starting with who should conduct the investigation. 
2. Who Investigates? 
Once a credible allegation of a violation has reached the institu-
tion—whether through the enforcement staff, ESPN, or an internal 
source—who should investigate?  Three choices emerge, though they 
are certainly not mutually exclusive.  The first choice is for the insti-
 159 For example, Baylor’s investigation team originally included three tenured law 
professors with prior infractions investigation experience. 
 160 See infra Section II.B.2 for further discussion on who should lead the investiga-
tion. 
 161 While some commissioners will play a more active role than others, all confer-
ence commissioners will want the institution to keep them informed.  The commis-
sioner is invited to make a statement at the COI hearing. 
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tution to step aside and allow the enforcement staff to investigate, 
while of course honoring the duty to cooperate.  The second choice 
is for the institution to conduct its own internal investigation.  Finally, 
the institution might choose to hire an outside specialist in compli-
ance issues.162  As noted, the options are not mutually exclusive, and 
the best choice usually involves a combination of action, cooperation, 
and consultation.  Even if the institution investigates itself, it will be 
wise to heavily involve the enforcement staff at every stage, and per-
haps to use a specialty firm or third party for certain issues.  Similarly, 
if the institution hires outside counsel to conduct the investigation, 
the institution would be wise to stay involved in the process rather 
than merely wait for a report months down the road. 
Why would an institution want to conduct its own internal inves-
tigation, or at least stay intensely involved throughout the process, 
when the Bylaws only impose a duty to cooperate?  First, at the pen-
alty stage, the institution will receive credit for self-reporting viola-
tions.163  While this potential credit is welcome, a more practical point 
is that helping to uncover the truth, and reporting it, will produce a 
favorable rapport with the enforcement staff, and will give positive 
fodder at the hearing, where the institution can demonstrate that it 
aggressively discharged its cooperative responsibility.164  Also, con-
ducting or staying intimately involved in the investigation gives the 
institution the opportunity to take corrective measures to fix the 
problems as they arise165 and to self-impose appropriate penalties 
along the way, both of which will be favorably received when being 
grilled before the COI.  A less obvious benefit also attaches: witnesses 
may be more forthcoming when interviewed by a representative of 
the institution, as opposed to being interviewed by an enforcement 
staff member from Indianapolis.  Some people (perhaps not just 
Texans) will not open up to strangers.  The enforcement staff will 
need access to the institution’s “local knowledge,” including policies, 
procedures, and personnel.  Who has custody of the coaching staff’s 
cell phone records?  Where is the academic standard in question 
published?  Who has expertise?  Supplying local knowledge is an im-
portant reason for continued involvement in the investigation, and if 
an internal investigation is the chosen route, local knowledge should 
allow the investigation to get off to a fast start. 
 162 See supra note 145. 
 163 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.2.1.2. 
 164 But see supra note 62. 
 165 See, e.g., Associated Press, supra note 146. 
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From an advocacy perspective, self investigation, or at least stay-
ing actively involved, allows an institution to ensure witnesses are not 
mistakenly confessing to violations that did not occur.  For example, 
during one interview, a Baylor employee misunderstood a question or 
had a memory lapse and told the enforcement staff that Baylor pro-
vided no rules education.  The FAR was present at the interview and 
asked whether the employee had attended university or conference 
events where compliance rules had been discussed.  The employee 
quickly remembered and was able to provide details about periodic 
rules-education meetings and luncheons.  Staying involved saved, at 
the very least, a confusing sequence of clarifying events and, at most, 
the institution being penalized for false information. 
Although conducting significant portions of the investigation in-
ternally can save the institution substantial legal fees, serious consid-
eration should be given to the ensuing time commitment.  A major-
infractions investigation is not a tens-of-hours time commitment.  
Hundreds of hours might not cover it.166  And the total time spent in-
vestigating will increase without involvement of some investigators 
with enforcement expertise. 
Public scrutiny is yet another important consideration.  The pub-
lic and media will likely be skeptical of an “internal” investigation, as 
perception is shaped by traditional adversarial notions and, for some, 
cynicism will jade claims of truth-seeking and open cooperation by a 
representative of the accused.  Because of this perception, presenta-
tion and investigator selection is paramount.  The investigators must 
be beyond reproach, both actually and apparently.  They must not 
only be able to ask the tough questions, but must also be perceived as 
willing and able to do so.  Here again, having established procedures 
in place will help, both with execution and perception.167
One suggestion for considering public perception and investiga-
tor choice is to think in terms of levels.  The institution gets one 
point, if you will, of credibility for every level the investigator is re-
moved from the accused.  So, if the basketball program is targeted, 
the investigator should be outside the basketball program.  Next, the 
investigator should be outside the athletics department.  Then, per-
haps from outside the university to outside counsel.  But even this fi-
 166 For a discussion of the time and resources that the enforcement staff dedicates 
to the investigation process, see Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA En-
forcement Process (Nov. 16, 2005), http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/ 
faq_enforcement.html, where question fifteen relates to the length of an infractions 
investigation. 
 167 See supra Section II.B.1. 
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nal level will not satisfy the darkest of cynics, as now the investigator is 
being paid by the accused. 
Before choosing a purely internal investigation, the institution 
should also consider the benefits from having an outside specialist in-
volved, either as the lead investigator or as an assistant.  An old adage 
in the law states that “a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a 
client.”168  Although the self-representing lawyer knows the law and 
the facts, perception is often skewed by self-interest.  Along with pro-
viding expertise, outside counsel will be better able to view this case 
from an objective perspective.  Moreover, having outside experts in-
volved in the investigation adds credibility to the investigation in the 
eyes of both the enforcement staff and the media.  Your authors 
submit that the proper question is rarely “should I involve outside 
counsel?” and is instead “should I hire them to conduct the investiga-
tion with our assistance or should I involve them to assist in our inves-
tigation?”  
3. Conducting the Internal Investigation 
As noted, choosing whether to investigate internally should not 
be viewed as mutually exclusive to either involving outside counsel or 
the enforcement staff.  The institution might hire an outside consult-
ing firm to be involved in the process, to perform certain tasks, or 
simply to provide perspective.  And importantly, when approaching 
an internal investigation, the institution should not take the mindset 
that this investigation is independent of the enforcement staff.  
Rather, the wise institution is the one that keeps the enforcement 
staff apprised of the investigation and coordinates interviews and 
other events with the enforcement staff.  A follow-up investigation will 
be much shorter if the institution involves the NCAA staff.169
The goal of an internal investigation should be to leave no holes 
to fill.  A less-than-thorough internal investigation will save the insti-
tution no money or time, as the enforcement staff will reproduce the 
investigation if it is unsatisfied with its thoroughness or procedures.170  
By coordinating the investigation and regularly communicating with 
the enforcement staff, the institution likely will garner goodwill and 
 168 See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 437–38 (1991). 
 169 Even when an institution chooses to investigate internally and file a self-report, 
it should notify the enforcement staff and allow the staff to participate.  See supra Sec-
tion II.A.3. 
 170 Telephone interview with David Price, Vice President for Enforcement Servs., 
NCAA, & Thomas C. Hosty, Dir. of Enforcement, NCAA (Jan. 3, 2007). 
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prevent duplicative investigatory steps.171  The compliance staff, to 
put it mildly, is dedicated to its role in uncovering the truth—and it is 
a mistake and a waste of time to conduct an investigation that leaves 
holes.  They fill these holes regularly, and any person involved in an 
internal investigation must dispose of any notion of hiding (or trying 
not to find) the truth.  If done properly, the internal investigation 
yields several benefits, not the least of which will be operating on an 
accelerated schedule and obtaining credit for self-reporting a viola-
tion if one is found. 
In our experience, the enforcement staff has usually been flexi-
ble and accommodating with regard to communication and coordi-
nation.  In the recent Baylor basketball case, the University cooper-
ated by scheduling interviews of major witnesses at mutually 
convenient times, making institutional employees available upon re-
quest, and furnishing interim self-reports and transcripts of interviews 
with which the enforcement staff was not involved.  Communication 
efforts between the University and the enforcement staff involved 
hundreds of telephone conferences, faxes, and e-mails.  This com-
munication continued even while the University prepared its re-
sponse and the enforcement staff drafted the case summary for the 
COI.  Because of the University’s excellent working relationship with 
the NCAA staff (including the enforcement staff and the staff as-
signed to the COI), Baylor received a much-needed extension to the 
deadline for the response to the Notice of Allegations.  The exten-
sion, granted by the COI involved a structured timetable that allowed 
Baylor to separately file its response to each of the fourteen allega-
tions included in the Notice of Allegations.  This formatted extension 
provided Baylor with the additional time needed to complete a thor-
ough response, but also allowed the assistant director of enforcement 
to begin preparing the case summary before the final extended dead-
line. 
A final, practical consideration deserves attention.  The investi-
gation process we have described is often sensitive, with severe poten-
tial consequences for persons and programs.172  Very careful consid-
eration must be given to the strained relationships that will likely 
result and whether the person chosen for the investigation holds a 
 171 Id. 
 172 The sensitivity of the investigation also requires that officials maintain confi-
dentiality to protect the investigation’s integrity.  The investigation team must be 
aware of the need to protect information and be willing to do so in the face of re-
quests, including those from the board members or coaches. 
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position that can afford strained relationships.173  For example, 
should the institution’s compliance staff be part of the investigation 
team?  Perhaps not.174  The institution needs coaches and players to 
be comfortable with the compliance staff.  Communication needs to 
remain open.  This need, along with the compliance staff’s rules-
education function, might be harmed by a compliance staff mem-
ber’s presence on the investigation team that “cost the team” scholar-
ships or worse.  Similar considerations caused serious reflections to 
whether one author could continue to serve as the FAR after partici-
pating in Baylor’s investigation. 
4. Investigative Procedures 
Whether the investigation is internal or enforcement-staff led, 
several procedural issues arise that differ from discovery in civil or 
criminal proceedings.  One problem is access to documents when 
preparing for the COI hearing.  When the enforcement staff con-
ducts interviews or gathers other information to be used in an en-
forcement case, it must provide the institution with access to the in-
terview transcripts or other evidence.175  But a very practical problem 
attaches to this access: An institution only has access to the docu-
ments at the NCAA national office or at the site of a custodial 
agent.176  For example, in Baylor’s recent basketball case, a local law 
firm served as the custodial agent.  Documents could neither be re-
moved from the office nor copied, and this remote access unneces-
sarily burdened preparation for the hearing.  In particular, one wit-
ness offered muddled testimony that at times seemed to contradict 
itself.  It was onerous for university officials to sufficiently analyze the 
nuances of the testimony, which related to numerous contested alle-
gations, and to reach conclusions without a transcript in front of 
them—notes on the more than eighty pages of testimony were often 
insufficient.  Institutional representatives had to make repeated trips 
to the custodial agent’s office to reread the transcript and take fur-
ther notes while facing the pressure of an impending deadline.  Pre-
 173 University of Nebraska Chancellor Harvey Perlman recently hinted at the po-
tential for strain while commending the university’s FAR Josephine Potuto, noting 
that she has “a strong enough personality to avoid being co-opted by the [athletics] 
department but [is] politically savvy enough to work well with them.”  Harvey 
Perlman & Josephine R. Potuto, Mission: Alignment.  Nebraska Chancellor, FAR Discuss 
Various Complexities of Presidential Control, THE NCAA NEWS, Apr. 11, 2005, at 5.  
 174 This concern was raised and discussed at a meeting of the directors of compli-
ance for the Big 12 Conference in Dallas in November 2006. 
 175 See NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaws 32.3.9, 32.3.10. 
 176 Id. at Bylaw 32.3.10. 
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cious time was diverted from serious response efforts to administra-
tive tasks such as coordinating visits with the custodial agent’s sched-
ule.  We suggest that the NCAA easily could remedy this additional 
distraction by creating a secure digital database of recorded testi-
mony, since it already must keep records of all interviews.177
Several other procedural mechanisms are also potentially prob-
lematic during an investigation.  The lack of subpoenas, the lack of a 
confrontation right, and the staff’s ability to grant use immunity cre-
ate an opportunity for “witnesses” to tattle and run without being 
tested under cross-examination.178  This combination enables an in-
terviewed student-athlete to testify without fear of penalty and without 
fear of the story being tested by adversarial questioning.  A notable 
example occurred during the recent investigation into Baylor’s men’s 
basketball program, when the enforcement staff offered immunity to 
a former student who had just transferred to another member institu-
tion.  The staff conducted the interview off campus without inform-
ing Baylor officials.  The University learned of the interview after it 
occurred.  The transcript was later placed with the custodial agent.  
Not only did the student have immunity from penalty and cross-
examination, he didn’t even have to face the institution he accused.  
The information gleaned from this interview was not particularly 
harmful to the institution’s case, but the procedure is unfair, and it is 
easy to imagine more damaging testimony, perhaps given by a dis-
gruntled former player or employee. 
The availability of a less-than-equal investigative process illus-
trates why cooperation and candor with the enforcement staff is vital.  
The enforcement staff members want to find the truth.  On this note, 
the NCAA’s Vice President for Enforcement David Price confirmed 
that the goal of an investigation is not to find a violation but rather 
the truth.179  If the investigation appears shady or not forthcoming, 
the enforcement staff will likely use all available tools without much 
sympathy when an uncooperative institution cries unfairness.  But by 
 177 Id. at Bylaws 32.3.9, 32.3.9.2.  There was a development in this area just before 
publication.  According to Thomas C. Hosty, NCAA director of enforcement, a “se-
cured custodial website,” which has been in the works for two years, is now opera-
tional.  E-mail from Thomas C. Hosty, Dir. of Enforcement, NCAA, to Mike Rogers, 
Professor of Law, Baylor Law School, and to Rory Ryan, Assistant Professor of Law, 
Baylor Law School (Feb. 6, 2007, 10:48 A.M.) (on file with authors).  The enforce-
ment staff expects the website to be “fully operational by April 2007 with all major 
cases.”  Id. 
 178 See NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.3.7. 
 179 Telephone interview with David Price, Vice President for Enforcement Servs., 
NCAA, & Thomas C. Hosty, Dir. of Enforcement, NCAA (Jan. 3, 2007). 
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maintaining goodwill and illustrating that the institution is both 
keeping the staff informed and honoring its commitment to self-
police, the institution will create a cooperative environment.  The 
staff surely realizes that it is unfair, for example, to allow a witness to 
tattle under immunity and run off without being subject to any adver-
sarial testing.  And the staff knows that the Bylaws permit this event.  
But our experience has shown that the staff does operate as though it 
works on a conviction-based commission and will generally use discre-
tion when investigating a cooperative, transparent institution.  In-
deed, during our interview, Director of Enforcement Thomas C. 
Hosty stated a point so simple that it might be overlooked: “If an in-
stitution feels something is unfair, tell the enforcement staff.”180  Basi-
cally, common sense informs this strategy: if you develop a good rela-
tionship with the staff, they won’t endeavor to treat you unfairly.  But 
of course, to the extent that the procedures are unfair, prosecu-
tor/investigator discretion is no answer to refusing reform.  Proce-
dural rules should define boundaries for prosecutorial discretion, not 
the other way around. 
C. War Story  
The story of Baylor’s tragic and all-too-infamous recent men’s 
basketball case is illustrative of the choices and procedures, as well as 
the importance of strategic decision-making, during a major-
infraction investigation.  Numerous allegations of violations and the 
tragic murder of a student-athlete propelled Baylor—already a repeat 
violator—into the crosshairs of the NCAA enforcement staff and the 
national media.181  This Section illustrates how the University’s pre-
existing investigation plan and the University’s rapid adaptation as 
the case evolved allowed the University to effectively manage the case.  
To be sure, the institution failed in myriad compliance and control 
issues.  But the investigation itself was commended, and likely kept 
Baylor from the death penalty.182
Much of Baylor’s strategic plan, in place already when the allega-
tions surfaced, served the university well.183  And when the plan did 
 180 Id. 
 181 The student’s death was not attributed to the institution’s violations, but it de-
fined the public’s perception of the scandal. 
 182 Hoover, supra note 61, at 33. 
 183 The investigation guidelines were drafted during the summer of 2001 by the 
FAR.  Following review by Baylor’s compliance stakeholders, the university president 
adopted the guidelines and appointed the investigation committee in October 2001.  
Investigation, Determination, and Reporting Procedures for Baylor University, avail-
able at http://www.ncaa.org (follow “The NCAA News” tab; then follow “NCAA News 
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not meet Baylor’s needs, the investigation committee modified its 
approach.  Initially, the plan designated an investigation team, which 
included three tenured law professors with prior experience conduct-
ing an NCAA investigation.  The involvement of tenured professors 
sheltered the committee from potential intimidation when the case 
touched on highly sensitive issues.  For example, the Baylor commit-
tee discovered donations made by leading members of the University 
community, including past and present regents.  The committee 
flushed out the underlying facts despite the sensitive nature of poten-
tial allegations of wrongdoing, and ultimately the investigation re-
vealed that the prominent donors did not violate NCAA legislation.184 
While the plan directed the investigative committee to conduct the 
investigation, the plan also involved outside counsel experienced in 
infractions cases and a consulting attorney who specialized in such 
cases.185
The pace of the investigation, as is common, played a crucial 
role in case management.  While Baylor’s plan provided for a speedy 
investigation, the constant barrage of media updates and the quickly 
approaching basketball season propelled the investigation into warp 
drive.  The use of an internal investigation committee allowed the in-
vestigation to proceed almost around the clock.  The committee 
worked long hours, seven days a week for two months, which led to 
prompt results.  Men’s basketball Head Coach Dave Bliss resigned 
within nineteen days of when the investigation began.  Also, within 
two weeks of opening the investigation, the need for serious self-
imposed sanctions became apparent.186  Almost with each day of in-
terviews and document review, the issues to be resolved multiplied, 
the seriousness of the case deepened, and the committee became in-
creasingly concerned over the possible imposition of the death pen-
alty.  When the investigation confirmed that the former head coach 
had paid thousands of dollars in educational expenses of two student-
athletes, the committee recommended self-imposed sanctions, in-
cluding the release of all players to allow transfers to other institu-
tions.  Two other characteristics of an internal committee also expe-
Archive” hyperlink; then follow “2006” hyperlink; then follow “Editorial”; then follow 
“Baylor University Investigation Determination and Reporting Procedures - Oct 23, 
2006 NCAA News” hyperlink). 
 184 Baylor University, Baylor Self Report (on file with the authors). 
 185 Kirk Watson, a partner in the Austin office of the Texas law firm Hughes & 
Luce, LLP, served as outside counsel during the investigation. 
 186 The self-imposed sanctions later served as a mitigating factor when the COI 
imposed penalties.  Baylor Infraction Report—2005, supra note 140; see also Hoover, 
supra note 61, at 33. 
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dited the investigation.  First, the committee possessed local knowl-
edge, such as where to locate certain information and documents.  
Second, the committee acted with the full authority of the university 
president. 
As to self-imposing sanctions, we did not think it was strategically 
sound to wait until a self-report could be prepared.  A self-report 
would take months, and we already knew we had a nasty major case.  
Our student-athletes were in hell, and we didn’t think a change in 
leadership, although necessary, was enough.  We needed to accept 
responsibility by imposing a severe penalty.  The key self-imposed 
penalty was offering a release to each of our players coupled with the 
promise to seek an Administrative Review Subcommittee (“ARS”)187 
waiver so they could be immediately eligible to play upon transfer.  
Our three best players transferred and (due to the waivers) made sig-
nificant contributions on NCAA tournament teams that season; two 
were conference players of the year.  Our top prospect was released 
from his national letter of intent and went elsewhere.  This sanction 
was creative; it combined a severe penalty to the basketball program 
coupled with a major student-athlete well-being component.  It may 
be the primary reason our basketball program was not suspended.  
Before the COI we argued that suspending the program would result 
in making us start over a second time.  By the time of the hearing, we 
had only one basketball student-athlete recruited by the former staff 
(a young man of excellent character who graduated in less than four 
years), a new director of athletics, and a new coaching staff.  We had 
also added additional sanctions and corrective measures at the time 
of filing the self-report—six months after the initial sanctions were 
self-imposed.  Should we have self-imposed additional penalties?  
While we could have, the prevailing thought was that we were in the 
ballpark already, and it was tough to overcome the sentiment that the 
COI was going to do something extra, and so the institution wanted to 
leave the COI room to act. 
The cooperative relationship formed with the enforcement staff 
was also important.  First, the COI considered Baylor’s cooperation 
when it imposed penalties.188  Gene Marsh, then chairman of the 
COI, suggested that Baylor’s cooperation likely saved the basketball 
program from the death penalty: “We were there, we considered this 
to be a death-penalty case, then we stepped back and looked at the 
 187 A subcommittee of the NCAA Management Council, the ARS has authority to 
review a staff application of the bylaws when no other committee, subcommittee, or 
conference has authority to do so.  NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at art. 5.4.1.4. 
 188 Hoover, supra note 61, at 33. 
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cooperation of the school, its honest and, frankly, very blunt ap-
proach to describing what their problems were.”189  As importantly, 
the cooperation earned the enforcement staff’s trust, which yielded 
tangible benefits during the investigation.  For example, early in the 
week following Coach Bliss’s resignation, the investigation committee 
received a call from the enforcement staff inviting the committee to 
participate in the interview of an assistant coach.  The staff said that 
the coach had knowledge of violations, but the staff had not been ap-
prised of specific details.  The coach began the interview by stacking 
cassette tapes on the conference room table, and the rest of the day 
was spent listening to the tapes, which included conversations secretly 
recorded by the former assistant coach.  Their content stunned all in-
vestigators, Baylor, and the NCAA.  One tape revealed Coach Bliss 
prompting a student-athlete to give false testimony to the investiga-
tion committee.  It was a despicable cover-up attempt that fortunately 
did not succeed.190  While the new information was devastating, 
Baylor was fortunate that the enforcement staff invited Baylor investi-
gators to participate in the interview.  But for the cooperation that 
led to Baylor’s inclusion in the interview, the media would have been 
briefing the University on this huge story of a failed cover-up attempt, 
rather than vice versa.  Also, Baylor solidified its credibility with sev-
eral regular media outlets covering the story by quickly informing 
them of this dramatic development.191  Finally, at the suggestion of 
the enforcement staff, the advance warning allowed Baylor to re-
interview the student to correct his story before the news story broke. 
The investigation committee also encountered issues unad-
dressed by the plan, particularly regarding communication with the 
media.  For credibility and accuracy reasons, the committee under-
took to handle its own media relations.  A media conference was held 
on the first Friday of the investigation to reveal that the University 
had hired outside counsel and to disclose the identities of the com-
mittee members and the investigation procedures.192  While the Uni-
versity president was in charge, the committee decided it was best that 
 189 Id. 
 190 Coach Bliss described the cover-up attempt as “despicable” during the COI 
hearing. See Baylor Infractions Report—2005, supra note 140.  He apologized and 
asked the COI to punish him, rather than Baylor.  Id. 
 191 See, e.g., Lee Hancock & Jeff Miller, Baylor Says Bliss Behind Cover-up; Assistant 
Taped Coach Telling Others to Lie About Payments, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 16, 
2003, at 1A. 
 192 Press Release, Baylor University, University Issues Statement on Basketball In-
vestigation (July 25, 2003), http://www.baylor.edu/pr/news.php?action=story& 
story=5344. 
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he not be constantly linked to the investigation.  The president only 
addressed the media on matters of great importance, such as the res-
ignation of Coach Bliss and the ordering self-imposed sanctions.  The 
committee briefed the media on discoveries of significance and en-
deavored to give a “heads-up” to the administration when items of in-
terest were likely to appear in the media. 
As to our assessment of the projected time commitment involved 
with conducting the internal investigation and preparing self reports, 
we were overly optimistic.  To be blunt, we were just plain wrong.  We 
made this mistaken assessment as several issues surfaced near the end 
of the summer of 2003.  Due to the timing, we knew that we had five 
weeks without classes to investigate (so much for a vacation).  We mis-
takenly believed that we could substantially complete the investigative 
phase during those five weeks.  Unfortunately, we soon learned that 
the issues initially known represented the tip of a very large iceberg.  
While a great deal was accomplished during the first month, there 
were serious violations yet to be uncovered, and the new issues to sort 
through seemed to be a rapidly renewable resource.  When classes 
began, the number of hours available for the committee to investi-
gate diminished and the time commitment shrank.  At that point, we 
had to rely more on outside counsel, particularly in reference to con-
ducting out-of-town interviews.  The first phase of the investigation 
ended in February 2004, and we thereafter filed a self-report.193  We 
learned, the very hard way, not to underestimate the time required to 
investigate and report the known issues, and that the prospect of un-
covering new issues must factor into the decision whether to delegate 
some investigative responsibilities to outside consultants.194
In summary, the mere presence of allegations creates an unfa-
vorable environment.  That environment, with its outside pressures 
and media presence, makes time essential and decision-making diffi-
cult.  Have a plan.  Formulate it during peacetime.  Who will investi-
gate?  Be sure that the investigators are chosen carefully, for the 
stakes are high and the investigative stage requires a team with integ-
rity, experience, and agility.  Who will address the media?  Where?  
 193 For details of the self-report, see Jeff Miller and Lee Hancock, Baylor Adds Sanc-
tions School Inquiry Finds More NCAA Abuses in Basketball Program Under Bliss, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Feb. 27, 2004, at 1A. 
 194 See Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA Enforcement Process (Nov. 
16, 2005), http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/faq_enforcement.html (question fif-
teen related to the length of an infractions investigation).  “In many instances, in-
formation is developed during a case which leads to the discovery of additional pos-
sible infractions, which broadens the scope of an investigation, necessitating more 
time to fully explore these additional issues.”  Id. 
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While a plan will not make the experience pleasant, it sure helps to 
stand before the media one hour after the news breaks and confi-
dently announce that you have a plan in place.  The plan will help 
you act effectively and efficiently—both traits that will give the institu-
tion a stronger presence should the case proceed to the NCAA’s ver-
sion of trial and appeal. 
III.     TRIAL AND APPEAL, NCAA STYLE 
The NCAA’s version of trial and appeal is different, and the dif-
ferences will readily appear to most lawyers.  Before addressing the 
formalities and differences, we offer some perspective on procedural 
differences and the balance between efficiency and accuracy. 
For the most part, the days of dueling to resolve disputes are be-
hind us.195  We often overlook how remarkable it is that even our 
most contentious disputes are resolved in courtrooms, with the par-
ties accepting the pronouncement of an unarmed judge and consid-
ering the dispute as finally settled.  When we entrust significant dis-
putes to peaceful, formal adversarial resolution, consistent 
application of meaningful procedural protections is essential to en-
hancing both the truth-finding function and the public’s perception 
thereof.  But perfect truth-seeking cannot be the only goal, lest dock-
ets would move so slowly that this system of dispute resolution would 
crumble.196  In other words, at some point, if efficiency in resolution 
always cowered to a more perfect search for the truth, despite dimin-
ishing returns, the truth-seeking function would be impaired at the 
macro level.  The resources and ancillary powers of the tribunal and 
its sovereign also impact what procedures are both available and de-
sirable. 
Accordingly, the procedures are not the same in every dispute-
resolution setting.  Trial procedures differ from those in arbitrations, 
which differ from those in honor code hearings at a law school.  Pro-
cedures differ among state and federal courts and even among courts 
within the same sovereign.  Accuracy and fairness are the ideals in 
each setting, but for the system to be effective and workable, those 
ideals must be balanced against efficiency and resource limitations.  
As an obvious example, while the procedural protections available to 
 195 Alison L. LaCroix, To Gain the Whole World and Lose His Own Soul: Nineteenth-
Century American Dueling as Public Law and Private Code, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 501, 501–
02 (2004). 
 196 Courts have consistently acknowledged the importance of judicial efficiency 
and have balanced that interest with the judiciary’s role to seek justice.  See, e.g., 
Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 197 (1996). 
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a capital-murder defendant might also advance the truth-seeking 
function of a proceeding to determine the validity of a speeding 
ticket, extending such protections would be shortsighted and ulti-
mately unworkable. 
Adversarial proceedings before the NCAA are not excepted from 
this balance.  While truth-seeking and fairness are of course the pri-
mary targets, a limited resource pool and the NCAA’s status as an as-
sociation—not a sovereign entity—limit the procedural protections 
available and desirable.  For example, the NCAA cannot administer 
oaths or hold persons or institutions in civil or criminal contempt.  
Similar to how NCAA investigatory procedures differ from pretrial 
proceedings in the civil and criminal justice systems, the NCAA ver-
sion of trial and appeal is both similar to and different from the trial-
and-appeal process in the courts.  In this Section, we will briefly dis-
cuss proceedings before the NCAA’s tribunal for major-infractions 
cases, the COI.  Then, we will discuss our final topic, the decision 
whether to appeal. 
A. COI Procedures 
Assuming the parties have not opted for summary disposition,197 
the COI must hold a hearing to determine the existence of an al-
leged violation and to impose appropriate penalties.198  This hearing 
ensures that imposing punitive sanctions in adversarial proceedings 
will not be undertaken without notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.199  The COI meets “approximately six times per year with each 
meeting typically lasting two to three days, during a weekend.”200  For 
simplicity we’ll refer to the COI proceeding as the “trial.” The COI 
will consider the charges presented by the prosecution (the enforce-
ment staff), consider evidence, both documentary and witness testi-
mony, make factual findings, and impose an appropriate sentence if 
it finds violations.201
Many familiar procedural protections available in criminal judi-
cial proceedings apply, in some form, at this trial.  For example, pre-
 197 See supra Section II.A. 
 198 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.8.1. 
 199 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416–18 (2003). 
 200 Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA Enforcement Process (Nov. 16, 
2005), http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/faq_enforcement.html (question “How 
does the Process Work?”).  The COI often conducts two hearings per meeting.  See id. 
 201 See id. 
RYANFINAL 4/9/2007  4:51:34 PM 
2007] NAVIGATING THE BYLAW MAZE 791 
 
hearing ex parte presentation of evidence is prohibited.202  A re-
quirement similar to the Brady doctrine203 of presenting all material 
information applies,204 but instead of imposing the disclosure duty 
only on the prosecution,205 both the enforcement staff and the ac-
cused institution must “ensure that the committee has [the] benefit 
of full information concerning each allegation, whether such infor-
mation corroborates or refutes an allegation.”206  Individuals re-
quested to appear have a right to counsel207 and may be excluded 
during parts of the trial not relating to them.208  Finally, judges with 
conflicts of interest should be recused, either by self-identification or 
upon request of the institution.209
Although the trial proceeds less formally than one might in your 
local federal courthouse, it has the same flavor.  The enforcement 
staff, as the prosecution, presents its opening statement, followed by 
the defense.210  This usually occurs on a count-by-count basis.211  
Then, the enforcement staff puts on its case-in-chief, followed by the 
defense.212  Closing arguments follow, with the institution closing be-
fore the enforcement staff.213  Similar to a trial judge, the COI retains 
discretion to control the exact procedures followed during the hear-
ing.214
Although the overall structure is familiar, many of the details, 
such as notice requirements, admissibility of evidence, examination 
 202 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.8.3; see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 3(b)(7) (2004). 
 203 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963); see also supra notes 52–55 and 
accompanying text. 
 204 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.8.4. 
 205 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87–88. 
 206 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.8.4. 
 207 Id. at Bylaw 32.8.6. 
 208 Id. at Bylaw 32.8.6.3.1; cf. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 267 (Vernon 
2006) (allowing the court to exclude witnesses from the hearing so they do not hear 
the testimony of other witnesses). 
 209 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.1.3. 
 210 Id. at Bylaw 32.8.7.1. 
 211 Telephone interview with Jo Potuto, Chair, NCAA Div. I COI (Jan. 2, 2007).  
Typically, the enforcement staff numbers the counts early in the process.  Id.  It does 
not renumber them to put closely related counts together.  Id.  To promote effi-
ciency, the COI proceedings often group related counts together for trial.  Id.  For 
example, if only counts three and seven involve an assistant coach, the COI might 
group those counts together so that the coach does not have to sit through several 
unrelated counts.  Id. 
 212 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaws 32.8.7.2–3. 
 213 Id. at Bylaw 32.8.7.1; cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.1 (listing the order of closing state-
ments as prosecutor, defendant, then prosecutor again). 
 214 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.8.7. 
RYANFINAL 4/9/2007  4:51:34 PM 
792 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:749 
 
of witnesses, and burdens of proof are different.  First, the COI hear-
ing is different from a criminal trial because the institution can be 
convicted of an offense that was not charged in the charging instru-
ment (i.e., the Notice of Allegations).215  The Bylaws provide that the 
hearing “shall be directed toward the allegations set forth in the No-
tice of Allegations but shall not preclude the committee from finding any 
violation resulting from information developed or discussed during the hear-
ing.”216  This language is potentially troubling—a lawyer can envision 
scrambling to mount a defense when the prosecution’s last witness 
raises a new allegation of a major infraction—but the IAC has sensibly 
interpreted it to not intrude upon an institution’s right to notice and 
a meaningful opportunity to be heard.217  The IAC has determined 
that the institution must be given notice and a meaningful opportu-
nity to be heard on all charges, including those first raised during the 
hearing.218  Thus, while the enforcement staff gets the benefit of es-
sentially amending the indictment to charge new conduct, the COI 
must control the proceedings to ensure that the timing does not im-
pair the institution’s ability to mount a defense. 
Another difference is evidentiary requirements.  When lawyers 
think of evidentiary restrictions, they usually think of fighting with a 
judge to keep a jury from seeing certain evidence.  Obviously, exclud-
ing prejudicial evidence during a bench trial is less meaningful, since 
even if the evidence is excluded, the fact-finder will nevertheless have 
viewed the prejudicial evidence anyway, if only to determine its in-
admissibility.  Such is also the case with the COI, where the COI itself 
determines admissibility, resolves disputed facts, and draws conclu-
sions about whether the determined facts constitute Bylaw viola-
tions.219  Very few rules of admissibility apply even ostensibly in a COI 
hearing.  The COI can receive all oral and documentary evidence, 
but may “exclude information that it determines to be irrelevant, 
immaterial or unduly repetitious.”220  In another provision, the Bylaws 
 215 Id. at Bylaw 32.8.7.5.  A prosecutor has limited authority to amend an indict-
ment once the trial begins.  UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 231(g)(2).  This section expressly ap-
plies to information, but is incorporated into the rules regarding an indictment.  
UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 232(b).  The prosecution may only proceed with the court’s per-
mission and may not add additional or different criminal charges or otherwise 
prejudice the rights of the defendant.  UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 231(g)(2). 
 216 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.8.7.5 (emphasis added). 
 217 See Kenneth J. Martin, The NCAA Infractions Appeals Committee: Procedure, Prece-
dent and Penalties, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 123, 152 (1999). 
 218 Id. 
 219 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.8.8. 
 220 Id. at Bylaw 32.8.7.4. 
RYANFINAL 4/9/2007  4:51:34 PM 
2007] NAVIGATING THE BYLAW MAZE 793 
 
define admissible evidence in equally vague terms: “The committee 
shall base its findings on information presented to it that it deter-
mines to be credible, persuasive and of a kind on which reasonably 
prudent persons rely in the conduct of serious affairs.”221  Neither of 
these rules provides a meaningful restriction on admissibility.  True 
admissibility restrictions keep fact-finders from considering poten-
tially persuasive evidence when making a finding.222  The NCAA By-
laws essentially tell the fact-finder to consider persuasive evidence and 
discard the rest, thus skipping the step of asking which evidence may 
be considered for its persuasiveness. 
There is, however, one important rule of evidentiary admissibil-
ity that applies to COI hearings.  The enforcement staff may not pre-
sent information from anonymous sources to the COI: 
[T]he enforcement staff shall present only information that can 
be attributed to individuals who are willing to be identified.  In-
formation obtained from individuals not wishing to be identified 
shall not be relied upon by the committee in making findings of 
violations.  Such confidential sources shall not be identified to ei-
ther the Committee on Infractions or the institution.223
While the enforcement staff may use the information obtained to ad-
vance its investigation (just as a prosecutor may use hearsay evidence 
to advance her investigation), such information is not admissible in a 
proceeding before the COI.  Of course for this restriction to be 
meaningful, the enforcement staff must be honorable,224 for once the 
information is presented to, and rejected by, the COI, the “jury” has 
been tainted. 
Although the no-anonymous-source rule protects against convic-
tion based on certain kinds of untestable evidence, the best protec-
tion—a formal right to confrontation and cross-examination225—does 
not apply.226  Except for accused individuals, few witnesses attend the 
hearings.  Even when they do, the COI does all the questioning.  
 221 Id. at Bylaw 32.8.8.2. 
 222 See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 1.1 (3d. ed. 
2003). 
 223 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.8.7.4.1. 
 224 Your authors are aware of no instances in which the COI has violated this no-
presentation rule. 
 225 The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the truth-seeking role 
that cross-examination plays.  “[N]o one experienced in the trial of lawsuits . . . 
would deny the value of cross-examination in exposing falsehood and bringing out 
the truth . . . .”  Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965). 
 226 Martin, supra note 217, at 158 (citing News Release, NCAA, Florida State Univer-
sity Public Infractions Appeals Committee Report at 14 (Oct. 1, 1996)). 
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While the institution and enforcement staff may request that the COI 
ask certain questions, the accused institution has no right to question 
the witnesses at the hearing.  The tone of the IAC’s report in the Flor-
ida State case227 suggests that the institution does have the right to 
have the appropriate questions asked, but the Bylaws make clear that the 
institution has no right to have its lawyers ask the questions.  While it 
would perhaps be difficult to explain to a layperson why this “proce-
dural” matter is a disadvantage, lawyers skilled in cross-examination 
recognize that proposing general matters of interest to a panel so 
that the panel can inquire is not an adequate substitute for the credi-
bility-testing crossfire. 
The next omission needs attention.  The Bylaws do not define a 
burden of persuasion. A procedure teacher’s nightmare.  Bylaw 
38.8.2 defines the permissible basis of the COI’s findings,228 and By-
law 32.8.7.4 discusses evidentiary admissibility.  But the Bylaws do not 
require a burden of persuasion. 
The burden of persuasion has two components, the risk of non-
persuasion and the standard of proof.  The risk of nonpersuasion 
refers to the consequence that flows if a burden of persuasion is 
not met.  The party that bears the burden of persuasion carries 
the risk of nonpersuasion: if the standard of proof is not met, the 
issue is decided against the party that bears the burden.  The 
standard of proof refers to the quality of convincingness: “beyond 
reasonable doubt,” “by clear and convincing evidence,” and “by 
the preponderance of the evidence” are all standards of proof.229
Who bears the risk of nonpersuasion?  Does the institution bear the 
burden of disproving the charges?  What is the standard of proof?  
While all of our interviewees suggested that the enforcement staff has 
the burden, the Bylaws contain no mention of this burden. 
We briefly offer three potential solutions, while leaving the de-
bate about the best choice to another article.  First, the Bylaws might 
define the standard of proof as “by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.”  Governing most civil cases, this standard simply means 
“more likely than not,” and is a much lighter burden for the plaintiff 
to bear than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard that governs 
 227 Id. 
 228 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.8.8.2 (“The committee shall base its 
findings on information presented to it that is determines to be credible, persuasive, 
and of a kind on which reasonably prudent persons rely in the conduct of certain af-
fairs.”). 
 229 Lawrence B. Solum, Presumptions and Transcendentalism—You Prove It! Why 
Should I?, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 691, 691–92 (1994). 
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criminal convictions.230  While an extended discussion of whether this 
burden is appropriate is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth 
noting that the “preponderance of the evidence” standard might be 
too low a hurdle for a “prosecution” in which an employee of the in-
stitution that makes the rules is the prosecutor in the institution’s tri-
bunal.  In that regard, the NCAA proceedings are more analogous to 
criminal proceedings, in which a prosecutor is an employee of the 
United States, in a United States court, alleging that the defendant 
violated United States laws.  Second, while the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” burden from criminal law is too heavy, perhaps the appropri-
ate balance is “clear and convincing evidence,” which translates sim-
ply into a “high degree of probability.”231  This burden would provide 
a middle ground, accounting for the quasi-criminal nature of the 
proceeding but also accounting for the limited resources of the Asso-
ciation.  Or third, perhaps the burden of persuasion should be “pre-
ponderance of the evidence” for all counts, but with a heightened 
burden accompanying charges of unethical conduct, which carry the 
most stigma and the harshest penalties.232
Regardless of what burden of persuasion is chosen, one should 
be defined.  The COI must determine whether a violation occurred.  
“Whether” is not a workable standard.  If twenty people tell a judge 
that a car ran a red light, the judge cannot say he knows whether the 
light was red, but he is pretty sure.  Enter the burdens of persuasion, 
which are necessary devices to determine “facts” based on recreated 
events from documentary and witness testimony.  They tell us just 
how pretty sure the judge must be.  
After the COI hears the case presentation, its members meet pri-
vately to resolve disputed facts and to determine whether those facts 
constitute violations—usually on the Sunday after the weekend hear-
ing.233  During deliberations, the COI may determine that new evi-
 230 2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 2916 
(2005) (noting that juries in a criminal trial must determine the validity of the essen-
tial facts beyond a reasonable doubt, even though a lesser burden may apply in lim-
ited circumstances); see also 1 LEONARD SAND, ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL ¶ 4.01 (2006) (model instruction 4-1). 
 231 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 230, § 2916. 
 232 The enforcement staff itself is cognizant of the stigma that attaches to even al-
legations of unethical conduct, and is therefore careful to ensure substantial informa-
tion exists before advancing such a prosecution.  Telephone interview with David 
Price, Vice President for Enforcement Servs., NCAA & Thomas C. Hosty, Dir. of En-
forcement, NCAA (Jan. 3, 2007). 
 233 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.8.8; telephone interview with Jo Po-
tuto, Chair, NCAA Div. I COI (Jan. 2, 2007). 
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dence is needed and request such evidence.234  If the COI determines 
that a violation occurred, it imposes the appropriate penalty or, in ex-
treme cases, recommends to the Management Council that the insti-
tution’s membership be suspended or terminated.235  Unanimity is 
not required for any aspect of the determination.236  Rather, unless 
fewer than eight COI members are present and voting, only a simple 
majority is needed to find a violation.237  The COI then follows the By-
law procedures for notifying the institution and public of the COI’s 
action.238  Then, assuming the worst, the institution must decide 
whether to appeal the decision to the IAC.239  
B. The Decision to Appeal 
Proceedings before the IAC are in many ways analogous to those 
before an appellate court, such as on issues of timing, preservation of 
error, grounds for appeal, and scope of appeal.240  While we will leave 
this comparison for another article, one issue related to the appeals 
process correlates well with our previous discussion: should the insti-
tution appeal?  
In determining whether to appeal to the IAC, some obvious con-
siderations arise: What are our chances of winning?  How much will it 
cost?  What will we win if we win?  These considerations must be bal-
anced against one another.  For example, if an institution can poten-
tially prevail on reversing a death penalty sentence, the institution 
might choose to suffer the cost, even for a relatively slight chance of 
winning.  Conversely, if the institution has a strong chance of prevail-
ing, but is appealing only a minor penalty or a slight reduction in a 
major penalty, perhaps the cost is not worth it. 
But looming around this balance is the issue of closure.  A ma-
jor-infractions case often, if not usually, inspires a media frenzy.  In 
Baylor’s recent major case, the law-school parking lot (the media 
headquarters) was consistently occupied by dozens of media vans.  In 
that situation, every development in the case was news.  This frenzy 
accompanies the case until the COI hearing.  Then come the find-
ings, including the damaging printed copy of all the bad things that 
occurred.  Very practically, before choosing to appeal, the institution 
 234 NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaw 32.8.8.1. 
 235 Id. at Bylaw 32.8.8.3. 
 236 Id. at Bylaw 32.8.8.4. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. at Bylaws 32.9.1–32.9.2. 
 239 See infra Section III.B. 
 240 See NCAA Manual, supra note 14, at Bylaws 32.10.1–11.5. 
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must ask whether it wants to prolong the frenzy until the IAC hearing 
and then rinse and repeat when the IAC issues its ruling.  Having ex-
hausted considerable funds and time, and having already suffered the 
recruiting and relational consequences of the major-infractions proc-
ess, an institution will sometimes determine that, even in the face of a 
potentially meritorious argument, the most meaningful relief is to 
remove itself from the sports page.  The urge to fight a minor injus-
tice or to be vindicated might yield to the desire for a clear parking 
lot. 
IV.     CONCLUSION 
With the first allegation of a major infraction, a unique and 
high-stakes process begins.  This process and its procedures are 
unique, bearing some resemblance to traditional adversarial proceed-
ings in the court system, yet molded to the NCAA’s structure and lim-
ited powers.  Many novel questions arise during this process, of both 
the can-I-do-this and the should-I-do-this varieties.  To answer—
indeed, even to identify—many of these questions, a facial review of 
the NCAA Bylaws provides an incomplete picture.  Experience pro-
vides a needed perspective. 
Our primary goals have been to combine different perspectives 
in analyzing permissible and desirable options and to suggest where 
the current system needs improvement.  The perspective represented 
in this Article is not the same one either of us had when we began 
writing.  It evolved as we debated the issues from our different per-
spectives and as we interviewed the chair of the COI, the president of 
enforcement, a director of enforcement, and a leading consulting at-
torney in the field. 
The end product, we hope, will appeal to a broad audience.  To 
those in the trenches, we hope to have provided a rough map of how 
to proceed through the Bylaw maze to avoid missteps, and perhaps 
more importantly, to help avoid errors of omission that arise when 
lack of experience serves as a barrier to identifying helpful options.  
As we sketched the map of what is a permissible and desirable path, 
we identified problem areas.  By analyzing these areas with a fair view 
of the practical realities, we hope to continue to trigger discussion 
among experts in the field and those with policymaking authority 
within the Association. 
And hopefully neither we nor our readers will acquire addi-
tional, hands-on perspective anytime soon. 
